Comparison Overview
SPIT PASLODE BENELUX

SPIT PASLODE BENELUX
't Hofveld 3, Groot-Bijgaarden, undefined, 1702, BE
Last Update: 19/12/2025
Officiële SPIT-PASLODE LinkedIn pagina! Dé specialist in bevestigingsmaterialen. La page LinkedIn officielle de SPIT-PASLODE, le spécialiste par excellence du matériel de fixation. ITW is een Amerikaanse multinational met 48.000 werknemers en een omzet 14 miljard Doll...

Builders FirstSource
6031 Connection Dr, Suite 400, Irving, TX, US, 75039
Last Update: 19/09/2026
Builders FirstSource is the nation’s largest supplier of structural building products, value-added components and services to the professional market for new residential construction and repair and remodeling. Our focus is on providing unparalleled service to both large...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

SPIT PASLODE BENELUX







Builders FirstSource






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Wholesale Building Materials Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for SPIT PASLODE BENELUX in 2026.
Incidents vs Wholesale Building Materials Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Builders FirstSource in 2026.
Incident History - SPIT PASLODE BENELUX (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SPIT PASLODE BENELUX cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Builders FirstSource (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Builders FirstSource cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

SPIT PASLODE BENELUX

Builders FirstSource
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.