Comparison Overview
Sparkasse Hattingen

Sparkasse Hattingen
Roonstr. 1, Hattingen, NRW, DE, 45525
Last Update: 19/01/2026
Sparkasse. Gut für Hattingen.

ING
Bijlmerdreef 106, Amsterdam, North Holland, NL, 1102 CT
Last Update: 06/09/2026
ING is a pioneer in digital banking and on the forefront as one of the most innovative banks in the world. As ING, we have a clear purpose that represents our conviction of people’s potential. We don’t judge, coach, or tell people how to live their lives. However big or...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Sparkasse Hattingen







ING






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Sparkasse Hattingen in 2026.
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ING in 2026.
Incident History - Sparkasse Hattingen (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Sparkasse Hattingen cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - ING (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ING cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Sparkasse Hattingen

ING
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to exposure of session tokens in the HTML response.
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to an XML external entity (XXE) injection flaw.
IBM Aspera Enterprise WebApps 1.0.0 through 1.0.6 could allow a local attacker to obtain sensitive information due to cleartext transmission of sensitive information.
IBM Planning Analytics 2.0, and 2.1 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to a stack-based buffer overflow.
IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 can allow a man-in-the-middle attacker to present a forged TLS certificate, intercept the connection, and capture the IAM bearer Authorization header automatically attached by the session adapter. The captured token grants full platform-scope tenant API access, enabling the attacker to read and manipulate the victim's DataStage projects, flows, assets, and pipeline definitions. This is client-side SDK code running on the user's own machine, so exploitation requires an external network interceptor rather than a co-tenant in the shared cluster.