Company Details
space-norway
114
8,676
5174
spacenorway.com
0
SPA_3377786
In-progress

Space Norway Company CyberSecurity Posture
spacenorway.comSpace Norway is Northern Europe’s leading satellite communications services provider and a key player in the European space industry. We provide secure and reliable satellite connectivity services to governments, public and defence sectors, commercial maritime, land-based industries, and broadcasters. Our portfolio of satellites, teleport infrastructure and sub-marine cables enables us to deliver intelligent solutions that meet the needs of clients in Europe, the Arctic, the Middle East and North Africa. Our team’s industry-leading expertise, agility and commitment to excellence allow us to respond swiftly to market demands, accelerating technological breakthroughs. Our mission is to harness space for security, research, commercial growth, and beyond. We remain at the forefront of innovation - enhancing life and expanding possibilities. The Group is owned by the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries and represents the Norwegian Government’s strategic interests in the sector. Our subsidiaries include Space Norway Satcom AS (formerly, Telenor Satellite AS), Space Norway Heosat AS, Statsat AS and Kongsberg Satellite Services AS (KSAT). Space Norway. Space for More.
Company Details
space-norway
114
8,676
5174
spacenorway.com
0
SPA_3377786
In-progress
Between 700 and 749

Space Norway Global Score (TPRM)XXXX

Description: In January 2022, Space Norway’s **Svalbard Undersea Cable System**—the world’s northernmost subsea fiber-optic cables connecting mainland Norway to the Svalbard archipelago—suffered deliberate sabotage. The damage occurred in a deep-sea section (980ft to 9,000ft depth) where cables are typically buried six feet below the seabed, yet were severed by suspected **Russian hybrid warfare tactics**. Norwegian police confirmed 'human impact' as the cause, while open-source investigations revealed **Russian trawlers made over a dozen passes** over the cable route before the outage. Though redundant systems prevented service disruption for Svalbard’s users (including critical Arctic research stations and satellite ground stations), the attack demonstrated **vulnerabilities in NATO’s northern infrastructure**. The incident aligned with broader Russian strategies to **test allied responses**, disrupt communications, and exploit undersea infrastructure as a **geopolitical pressure point**. No perpetrators were prosecuted due to lack of direct evidence, but the pattern mirrored other **Baltic Sea cable sabotage** linked to Russia’s shadow fleet, reinforcing concerns over **critical infrastructure resilience** in the High North.


No incidents recorded for Space Norway in 2025.
No incidents recorded for Space Norway in 2025.
No incidents recorded for Space Norway in 2025.
Space Norway cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries

Space Norway is Northern Europe’s leading satellite communications services provider and a key player in the European space industry. We provide secure and reliable satellite connectivity services to governments, public and defence sectors, commercial maritime, land-based industries, and broadcasters. Our portfolio of satellites, teleport infrastructure and sub-marine cables enables us to deliver intelligent solutions that meet the needs of clients in Europe, the Arctic, the Middle East and North Africa. Our team’s industry-leading expertise, agility and commitment to excellence allow us to respond swiftly to market demands, accelerating technological breakthroughs. Our mission is to harness space for security, research, commercial growth, and beyond. We remain at the forefront of innovation - enhancing life and expanding possibilities. The Group is owned by the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries and represents the Norwegian Government’s strategic interests in the sector. Our subsidiaries include Space Norway Satcom AS (formerly, Telenor Satellite AS), Space Norway Heosat AS, Statsat AS and Kongsberg Satellite Services AS (KSAT). Space Norway. Space for More.

Welcome to Deutsche Telekom. As one of the world's most valuable brands, we design innovative solutions and products in the areas of connectivity, networks, digitalization and security. #connectingyourworld At Deutsche Telekom, we believe that each and every one of us has the power to move society
Millicom (NASDAQ U.S.: TIGO, Nasdaq) is a leading provider of fixed and mobile telecommunications services in Latin America. Through our TIGO® and Tigo Business® brands, we provide a wide range of digital services and products, including TIGO Money for mobile financial services, TIGO Sports for loca

We are a forward-focused digital champion always been focused on innovation and evolution. Our purpose is to create and bring greater dimension and richness to people’s personal and professional lives. With stc, You will always be empowered to focus on delivering what’s next through collaborati
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Telcel (Radiomóvil Dipsa) es subsidiaria de América Móvil, uno de los mayores proveedores de comunicaciones celulares de Latinoamérica, grupo líder con inversiones en telecomunicaciones en varios países del continente americano. Telcel es la empresa de telefonía celular líder en México. Nuestra s
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For decades, satellite communications systems operated under a comforting illusion: that their physical distance from terrestrial networks...
A British general says their satellites are being disrupted by other actors. A Norwegian researcher says we will see more of this in the...
Space Norway has signed a contract with SpaceX for the launch of the new communications satellite, THOR 8, into geostationary orbit.
Space Norway, a leading provider of satellite services across Europe, and Allente, a major player in the Nordic pay-TV market.
Space Norway and Telenor Nordics have announced a new agreement focused on delivering IPTV and linear OTT streaming services to the pay-TV...
Space is essential to the Alliance's deterrence and defence, underpinning its ability to navigate and track forces, to maintain robust...
Norway warns of dangers from Swedish rocket launches as the two nations clash over Europe's space ambitions and satellite plans.
The two are preparing to connect the Arctic with non-geostationary orbiting (NGSO) satellite payloads, GX10A and 10B – UK regulator mulls...
Space Norway, Northern Europe's leading satellite operator, is pleased to announce that it has signed an agreement with Starlink by SpaceX.

Explore insights on cybersecurity incidents, risk posture, and Rankiteo's assessments.
The official website of Space Norway is http://www.spacenorway.com.
According to Rankiteo, Space Norway’s AI-generated cybersecurity score is 749, reflecting their Moderate security posture.
According to Rankiteo, Space Norway currently holds 0 security badges, indicating that no recognized compliance certifications are currently verified for the organization.
According to Rankiteo, Space Norway is not certified under SOC 2 Type 1.
According to Rankiteo, Space Norway does not hold a SOC 2 Type 2 certification.
According to Rankiteo, Space Norway is not listed as GDPR compliant.
According to Rankiteo, Space Norway does not currently maintain PCI DSS compliance.
According to Rankiteo, Space Norway is not compliant with HIPAA regulations.
According to Rankiteo,Space Norway is not certified under ISO 27001, indicating the absence of a formally recognized information security management framework.
Space Norway operates primarily in the Satellite Telecommunications industry.
Space Norway employs approximately 114 people worldwide.
Space Norway presently has no subsidiaries across any sectors.
Space Norway’s official LinkedIn profile has approximately 8,676 followers.
Space Norway is classified under the NAICS code 5174, which corresponds to Satellite Telecommunications.
No, Space Norway does not have a profile on Crunchbase.
Yes, Space Norway maintains an official LinkedIn profile, which is actively utilized for branding and talent engagement, which can be accessed here: https://www.linkedin.com/company/space-norway.
As of November 27, 2025, Rankiteo reports that Space Norway has experienced 1 cybersecurity incidents.
Space Norway has an estimated 34 peer or competitor companies worldwide.
Incident Types: The types of cybersecurity incidents that have occurred include Cyber Attack.
Detection and Response: The company detects and responds to cybersecurity incidents through an incident response plan activated with nato operation baltic sentry (2024), incident response plan activated with finnish national bureau of investigation (estlink 2 case), incident response plan activated with norwegian police (svalbard cable investigation), and third party assistance with marinetraffic (ship tracking data), third party assistance with open-source intelligence (osint) for trawler movements, and and containment measures with detention of *eagle s* vessel (later released), containment measures with increased maritime patrols (nato assets), and remediation measures with cable repairs (status unspecified), remediation measures with nato-industry collaboration for infrastructure resilience, and recovery measures with swedish military exercises (counter-sabotage drills), recovery measures with enhanced surveillance of undersea cables, and communication strategy with public statements by nato secretary general mark rutte, communication strategy with media interviews with lithuanian fm gabrielius landsbergis, communication strategy with cbs news investigative reports, and enhanced monitoring with nato naval drones and aircraft patrols, enhanced monitoring with national surveillance assets (unspecified)..
Title: Alleged Russian Sabotage of Undersea Cables in the Baltic Sea (2022–2024)
Description: A series of suspected sabotage incidents targeting undersea fiber optic cables in the Baltic Sea, allegedly linked to Russian hybrid warfare tactics. The cables, critical for global internet traffic, financial transactions, and military communications, were damaged in multiple instances, including drag marks from anchors and loitering vessels. Finland, Estonia, Norway (Svalbard), and other Baltic NATO members reported disruptions, with Russia denying involvement. The incidents are part of broader hybrid warfare tactics, including cyberattacks, infrastructure sabotage, and espionage, aimed at testing NATO resolve and intimidating regional populations. NATO launched 'Baltic Sentry' in 2024 to counter these threats.
Date Detected: 2022-01-07
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2022-02-00
Type: Physical Sabotage
Attack Vector: Anchor Dragging (Ships/Trawlers)Underwater Sabotage (Unconfirmed Explosives)Loitering Near Cable RoutesPlausible Deniability via 'Shadow Fleet' Vessels
Vulnerability Exploited: Shallow Depth of Baltic Sea (Ease of Anchor Damage)Unburied or Lightly Buried Cables in Steep TerrainLack of Real-Time Monitoring for Undersea InfrastructureGeopolitical Tensions (NATO Expansion, Ukraine War)
Threat Actor: Primary: Russian State-Affiliated Actors (Alleged)Secondary: ["Russian 'Shadow Fleet' Vessels (e.g., *Eagle S*)", 'Russian Fishing Trawlers (Svalbard Incident)', 'Ukrainian Citizens Linked to Russian Intelligence (Poland Rail Sabotage)']Denial: Russia denies all allegations, labeling them 'Russophobia'
Motivation: Intimidation of Baltic States and NATO AlliesTesting NATO Unity and Response CapabilitiesDisruption of Critical Infrastructure as Hybrid Warfare TacticRetaliation for Western Support of UkrainePotential Prelude to Larger Military Escalation
Common Attack Types: The most common types of attacks the company has faced is Cyber Attack.
Identification of Attack Vectors: The company identifies the attack vectors used in incidents through Anchor Drag Marks (Physical Damage)Vessel Loitering Near Cable Routes (Reconnaissance).

Systems Affected: Estlink 2 (Finland-Estonia Power/Telecom Cable)Svalbard Undersea Cable System (Norway)Unspecified Telecom Cables in Gulf of Finland
Downtime: [{'system': 'Estlink 2', 'duration': 'Partial outage (Christmas 2024)', 'restoration': 'Unknown'}, {'system': 'Svalbard Cable', 'duration': 'Jan 7, 2022 (Redundant cable prevented service loss)', 'restoration': 'Investigation closed (no evidence)'}]
Operational Impact: Reduced Interconnectivity Between Finland and EstoniaIncreased NATO Maritime Patrols (Operation Baltic Sentry)Swedish Military Exercises for Counter-Sabotage
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of Trust in Undersea Infrastructure ResiliencePerception of NATO Vulnerability to Hybrid Threats
Legal Liabilities: Finnish Criminal Charges Against *Eagle S* Crew (Dismissed on Appeal)

Entity Name: Finland
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Critical Infrastructure (Energy/Telecom)
Location: Baltic Sea (Gulf of Finland)
Size: National
Customers Affected: Partial outage for Finland-Estonia connectivity

Entity Name: Estonia
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Critical Infrastructure (Energy/Telecom)
Location: Baltic Sea (Gulf of Finland)
Size: National
Customers Affected: Partial outage for Finland-Estonia connectivity

Entity Name: Norway (Space Norway)
Entity Type: State-Owned Enterprise
Industry: Telecommunications
Location: Greenland Sea (Svalbard Cable)
Size: National
Customers Affected: No service loss (redundant cable)

Entity Name: NATO
Entity Type: Military Alliance
Industry: Defense/Critical Infrastructure Protection
Location: Baltic Sea Region
Size: Multinational
Customers Affected: Increased operational burden (Baltic Sentry)

Incident Response Plan Activated: ['NATO Operation Baltic Sentry (2024)', 'Finnish National Bureau of Investigation (Estlink 2 Case)', 'Norwegian Police (Svalbard Cable Investigation)']
Third Party Assistance: Marinetraffic (Ship Tracking Data), Open-Source Intelligence (Osint) For Trawler Movements.
Containment Measures: Detention of *Eagle S* Vessel (Later Released)Increased Maritime Patrols (NATO Assets)
Remediation Measures: Cable Repairs (Status Unspecified)NATO-Industry Collaboration for Infrastructure Resilience
Recovery Measures: Swedish Military Exercises (Counter-Sabotage Drills)Enhanced Surveillance of Undersea Cables
Communication Strategy: Public Statements by NATO Secretary General Mark RutteMedia Interviews with Lithuanian FM Gabrielius LandsbergisCBS News Investigative Reports
Enhanced Monitoring: NATO Naval Drones and Aircraft PatrolsNational Surveillance Assets (Unspecified)
Incident Response Plan: The company's incident response plan is described as NATO Operation Baltic Sentry (2024), Finnish National Bureau of Investigation (Estlink 2 Case), Norwegian Police (Svalbard Cable Investigation), .
Third-Party Assistance: The company involves third-party assistance in incident response through MarineTraffic (Ship Tracking Data), Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) for Trawler Movements, .
Prevention of Data Exfiltration: The company takes the following measures to prevent data exfiltration: Cable Repairs (Status Unspecified), NATO-Industry Collaboration for Infrastructure Resilience, .
Handling of PII Incidents: The company handles incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) through by detention of *eagle s* vessel (later released), increased maritime patrols (nato assets) and .
Data Recovery from Ransomware: The company recovers data encrypted by ransomware through Swedish Military Exercises (Counter-Sabotage Drills), Enhanced Surveillance of Undersea Cables, .

Legal Actions: Finnish Criminal Case Against *Eagle S* Crew (Dismissed),
Regulatory Notifications: NATO Coordination Under Article 5 (Potential Future Trigger)
Ensuring Regulatory Compliance: The company ensures compliance with regulatory requirements through Finnish Criminal Case Against *Eagle S* Crew (Dismissed), .

Lessons Learned: Undersea Cables Are Vulnerable to Physical Sabotage in Shallow Waters, Hybrid Warfare Blurs Lines Between Cyber, Physical, and Psychological Attacks, Plausible Deniability via 'Shadow Fleet' Complicates Attribution, NATO Unity Is Critical to Deterring Further Escalation, Redundant Infrastructure Mitigates Operational Impact (e.g., Svalbard Cables)

Recommendations: Increase Real-Time Monitoring of Undersea Cables with AI/ML Anomaly Detection, Deepen NATO-Industry Collaboration for Infrastructure Hardening, Clarify Thresholds for Invoking Article 5 in Hybrid Warfare Scenarios, Expand Maritime Domain Awareness in the Baltic Sea, Develop Rapid-Response Protocols for Cable Sabotage IncidentsIncrease Real-Time Monitoring of Undersea Cables with AI/ML Anomaly Detection, Deepen NATO-Industry Collaboration for Infrastructure Hardening, Clarify Thresholds for Invoking Article 5 in Hybrid Warfare Scenarios, Expand Maritime Domain Awareness in the Baltic Sea, Develop Rapid-Response Protocols for Cable Sabotage IncidentsIncrease Real-Time Monitoring of Undersea Cables with AI/ML Anomaly Detection, Deepen NATO-Industry Collaboration for Infrastructure Hardening, Clarify Thresholds for Invoking Article 5 in Hybrid Warfare Scenarios, Expand Maritime Domain Awareness in the Baltic Sea, Develop Rapid-Response Protocols for Cable Sabotage IncidentsIncrease Real-Time Monitoring of Undersea Cables with AI/ML Anomaly Detection, Deepen NATO-Industry Collaboration for Infrastructure Hardening, Clarify Thresholds for Invoking Article 5 in Hybrid Warfare Scenarios, Expand Maritime Domain Awareness in the Baltic Sea, Develop Rapid-Response Protocols for Cable Sabotage IncidentsIncrease Real-Time Monitoring of Undersea Cables with AI/ML Anomaly Detection, Deepen NATO-Industry Collaboration for Infrastructure Hardening, Clarify Thresholds for Invoking Article 5 in Hybrid Warfare Scenarios, Expand Maritime Domain Awareness in the Baltic Sea, Develop Rapid-Response Protocols for Cable Sabotage Incidents
Key Lessons Learned: The key lessons learned from past incidents are Undersea Cables Are Vulnerable to Physical Sabotage in Shallow Waters,Hybrid Warfare Blurs Lines Between Cyber, Physical, and Psychological Attacks,Plausible Deniability via 'Shadow Fleet' Complicates Attribution,NATO Unity Is Critical to Deterring Further Escalation,Redundant Infrastructure Mitigates Operational Impact (e.g., Svalbard Cables).

Source: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
URL: https://rusi.org
Date Accessed: 2024-11-00

Source: Finnish National Bureau of Investigation
URL: https://poliisi.fi
Date Accessed: 2024-10-00

Source: Space Norway (Svalbard Cable Operator)
Date Accessed: 2022-01-00

Source: NATO Press Release (Operation Baltic Sentry)
URL: https://www.nato.int
Date Accessed: 2024-01-00
Additional Resources: Stakeholders can find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices at and Source: CBS NewsUrl: https://www.cbsnews.comDate Accessed: 2024-11-00, and Source: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)Url: https://rusi.orgDate Accessed: 2024-11-00, and Source: Finnish National Bureau of InvestigationUrl: https://poliisi.fiDate Accessed: 2024-10-00, and Source: Space Norway (Svalbard Cable Operator)Url: https://spacenorway.noDate Accessed: 2022-01-00, and Source: NATO Press Release (Operation Baltic Sentry)Url: https://www.nato.intDate Accessed: 2024-01-00.

Investigation Status: [{'case': 'Estlink 2 (Finland-Estonia)', 'status': 'Criminal Charges Dismissed (Prosecutors Appealing)'}, {'case': 'Svalbard Cable (Norway)', 'status': 'Closed (Lack of Evidence)'}, {'case': 'Polish Rail Sabotage', 'status': 'Ongoing (Suspects Identified)'}]
Communication of Investigation Status: The company communicates the status of incident investigations to stakeholders through Public Statements By Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte, Media Interviews With Lithuanian Fm Gabrielius Landsbergis and Cbs News Investigative Reports.

Stakeholder Advisories: Nato Members Urged To Enhance Critical Infrastructure Protection, Baltic States Advised To Diversify Connectivity Routes, Energy And Telecom Sectors Warned Of Hybrid Threats.
Advisories Provided: The company provides the following advisories to stakeholders and customers following an incident: were Nato Members Urged To Enhance Critical Infrastructure Protection, Baltic States Advised To Diversify Connectivity Routes and Energy And Telecom Sectors Warned Of Hybrid Threats.

Entry Point: Anchor Drag Marks (Physical Damage), Vessel Loitering Near Cable Routes (Reconnaissance),
Reconnaissance Period: ['Svalbard Incident: >12 Trawler Passes Before Damage', 'Eagle S: Departed Ust-Luga on Day of Outage']
High Value Targets: Estlink 2 (Finland-Estonia Interconnect), Svalbard Cable (Northernmost Subsea System), Baltic Nato Members' Limited Redundancy,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Estlink 2 (Finland-Estonia Interconnect), Svalbard Cable (Northernmost Subsea System), Baltic Nato Members' Limited Redundancy,

Root Causes: Geopolitical Tensions (Russia-Nato, Ukraine War), Physical Vulnerability Of Undersea Cables In Shallow Waters, Lack Of Unified Deterrence Against Hybrid Tactics, Plausible Deniability Via Non-State Proxy Vessels,
Corrective Actions: Nato Operation Baltic Sentry (Maritime Patrols), Finnish Appeal Of Dismissed Charges Against *Eagle S* Crew, Swedish Counter-Sabotage Military Exercises, Proposed Nato Article 5 Clarifications For Hybrid Attacks,
Post-Incident Analysis Process: The company's process for conducting post-incident analysis is described as Marinetraffic (Ship Tracking Data), Open-Source Intelligence (Osint) For Trawler Movements, , Nato Naval Drones And Aircraft Patrols, National Surveillance Assets (Unspecified), .
Corrective Actions Taken: The company has taken the following corrective actions based on post-incident analysis: Nato Operation Baltic Sentry (Maritime Patrols), Finnish Appeal Of Dismissed Charges Against *Eagle S* Crew, Swedish Counter-Sabotage Military Exercises, Proposed Nato Article 5 Clarifications For Hybrid Attacks, .
Last Attacking Group: The attacking group in the last incident were an Primary: Russian State-Affiliated Actors (Alleged)Secondary: ["Russian 'Shadow Fleet' Vessels (e.g., *Eagle S*)", 'Russian Fishing Trawlers (Svalbard Incident)', 'Ukrainian Citizens Linked to Russian Intelligence (Poland Rail Sabotage)']Denial: Russia denies all allegations and labeling them 'Russophobia'.
Most Recent Incident Detected: The most recent incident detected was on 2022-01-07.
Most Recent Incident Publicly Disclosed: The most recent incident publicly disclosed was on 2022-02-00.
Most Significant System Affected: The most significant system affected in an incident was Estlink 2 (Finland-Estonia Power/Telecom Cable)Svalbard Undersea Cable System (Norway)Unspecified Telecom Cables in Gulf of Finland.
Third-Party Assistance in Most Recent Incident: The third-party assistance involved in the most recent incident was marinetraffic (ship tracking data), open-source intelligence (osint) for trawler movements, .
Containment Measures in Most Recent Incident: The containment measures taken in the most recent incident was Detention of *Eagle S* Vessel (Later Released)Increased Maritime Patrols (NATO Assets).
Most Significant Legal Action: The most significant legal action taken for a regulatory violation was Finnish Criminal Case Against *Eagle S* Crew (Dismissed), .
Most Significant Lesson Learned: The most significant lesson learned from past incidents was Redundant Infrastructure Mitigates Operational Impact (e.g., Svalbard Cables).
Most Significant Recommendation Implemented: The most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity was Increase Real-Time Monitoring of Undersea Cables with AI/ML Anomaly Detection, Deepen NATO-Industry Collaboration for Infrastructure Hardening, Clarify Thresholds for Invoking Article 5 in Hybrid Warfare Scenarios, Expand Maritime Domain Awareness in the Baltic Sea and Develop Rapid-Response Protocols for Cable Sabotage Incidents.
Most Recent Source: The most recent source of information about an incident are Finnish National Bureau of Investigation, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), NATO Press Release (Operation Baltic Sentry), CBS News and Space Norway (Svalbard Cable Operator).
Most Recent URL for Additional Resources: The most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices is https://www.cbsnews.com, https://rusi.org, https://poliisi.fi, https://spacenorway.no, https://www.nato.int .
Current Status of Most Recent Investigation: The current status of the most recent investigation is [{'case': 'Estlink 2 (Finland-Estonia)', 'status': 'Criminal Charges Dismissed (Prosecutors Appealing)'}, {'case': 'Svalbard Cable (Norway)', 'status': 'Closed (Lack of Evidence)'}, {'case': 'Polish Rail Sabotage', 'status': 'Ongoing (Suspects Identified)'}].
Most Recent Stakeholder Advisory: The most recent stakeholder advisory issued was NATO Members Urged to Enhance Critical Infrastructure Protection, Baltic States Advised to Diversify Connectivity Routes, Energy and Telecom Sectors Warned of Hybrid Threats, .
Most Recent Reconnaissance Period: The most recent reconnaissance period for an incident was Svalbard Incident: >12 Trawler Passes Before DamageEagle S: Departed Ust-Luga on Day of Outage.
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