Comparison Overview
Southern Industrial Constructors, Inc.

Southern Industrial Constructors, Inc.
6101 Triangle Drive, Raleigh, 27617, US
Last Update: 03/04/2026
Since 1962, Southern Industrial Constructors, Inc. (SIC) has been safely and cost effectively providing industrial construction services to the manufacturing, process and power industries on a turnkey and stand-alone basis for over six decades all over the Carolinas and...

COLAS
1, Rue du Colonel Pierre Avia, Paris, 75015, FR
Last Update: 14/09/2026
Colas, a subsidiary of the Bouygues Group, is a major player in the construction and maintenance of transportation infrastructure and urban development. Colas covers the entire value chain: from industrial production to service offerings, including construction work. ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Southern Industrial Constructors, Inc.







COLAS






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Southern Industrial Constructors, Inc. in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for COLAS in 2026.
Incident History - Southern Industrial Constructors, Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Southern Industrial Constructors, Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - COLAS (X = Date, Y = Severity)
COLAS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Southern Industrial Constructors, Inc.

COLAS
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.