Comparison Overview
South African Police Service (SAPS)

South African Police Service (SAPS)
N/A
Last Update: 20/04/2026
The South African Police Service (SAPS) is the national police force of the Republic of South Africa. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) lays down that the South African Police Service has a responsibility to - - prevent, comb...

SAPS
ZA
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Policing in South Africa. I am attached to the newly formed Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations. Formally I was attached to the Detecitve Service and have been conduction investigations for over 25 years. I have also been attached to the National Inspectorate ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

South African Police Service (SAPS)







SAPS






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Law Enforcement Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for South African Police Service (SAPS) in 2026.
Incidents vs Law Enforcement Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for SAPS in 2026.
Incident History - South African Police Service (SAPS) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
South African Police Service (SAPS) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - SAPS (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SAPS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

South African Police Service (SAPS)

SAPS
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.