Company Details
sourcefire
75
17,596
541514
sourcefire.com
0
SOU_1724064
In-progress

Sourcefire, part of Cisco Company CyberSecurity Posture
sourcefire.comSourcefire, Inc. (Nasdaq:FIRE), a world leader in intelligent cybersecurity solutions, is transforming the way global mid- to large-size organizations and government agencies manage and minimize network security risks. With solutions from the network to the endpoint, Sourcefire provides customers with Agile Security that is as dynamic as the real world it protects and the attackers against which it defends. Trusted for more than 10 years, Sourcefire has been consistently recognized for its innovation and industry leadership with dozens of patents, world-class research, and award-winning technology. Today, the name Sourcefire has grown synonymous with innovation, security intelligence and agile end-to-end security infrastructure. For more information about Sourcefire, please visit www.sourcefire.com. For more on our product performance, see NSS Labs' results, summarized here: http://blog.sourcefire.com/2012/04/sourcefire-firepower-bigger-stronger.html.
Company Details
sourcefire
75
17,596
541514
sourcefire.com
0
SOU_1724064
In-progress
Between 750 and 799

SPC Global Score (TPRM)XXXX

Description: The California Office of the Attorney General reported on October 25, 2016, that Cisco Systems, Inc. experienced a data breach on August 18, 2016. The breach involved a security setting error on the Cisco Professional Careers mobile website, potentially exposing job application-related personal information including names, addresses, emails, phone numbers, and other sensitive data. Approximately individuals were affected.
Description: A former Cisco employee accessed the company's cloud infrastructure in 2018, five months after resigning, to deploy code that led to the shutdown of more than 16,000 WebEx Teams accounts and the deletion of 456 virtual machines. 30-year-old Sudhish Kasaba Ramesh accessed Cisco's cloud infrastructure hosted on Amazon Web Services without permission on September 24, 2018. The shutdown forced Cisco to spend more than $2,400,000 in customer refunds and employee time needed to restore the damage caused by Ramesh.
Description: Cisco has was targeted in a data leaked by the Yanluowang ransomware gang in September 2022. The gang leaked the data that was stolen from the company network during a cyberattack in May. The stolen data included non-sensitive files from the employee’s Box folder and thousands of files amounting to 55GB and that the cache included classified documents, technical schematics, and source code.
Description: Government cyber agencies globally, including Canada’s CSE and the U.S. CISA, have issued urgent warnings about a sophisticated **state-sponsored espionage campaign** (ArcaneDoor) exploiting vulnerabilities in **Cisco’s Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA)**, widely used for VPNs by remote workers and critical infrastructure. The attackers implanted malware, executed commands, and potentially **exfiltrated data** from compromised devices, targeting legacy systems with high evasion capabilities. The U.S. mandated federal agencies to patch vulnerabilities within 24 hours, labeling the threat as **significant risk to victim networks**. The UK’s NCSC noted the malware’s **evolution in sophistication**, while Cisco confirmed the actor’s focus on espionage. Critical sectors—governments, academia, and research facilities—were urged to act immediately. The attack’s scope remains under investigation, but its **advanced persistence mechanisms** and potential for **data theft from high-value targets** (e.g., state secrets, intellectual property) pose severe operational and national security risks. The campaign’s **targeting of VPN infrastructure** could enable lateral movement into broader networks, amplifying the threat to organizational integrity and confidentiality.
Description: The **U.K. National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)** disclosed that **state-sponsored threat actors (UAT4356/Storm-1849, linked to China)** exploited **zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-20362, CVE-2025-20333)** in **Cisco ASA 5500-X Series firewalls** to deploy **previously undocumented malware (RayInitiator, LINE VIPER)**. The attack targeted **multiple government agencies**, enabling **persistent access, command execution, data exfiltration, and forensic evasion** by modifying the **ROMMON bootloader** and disabling logging. The compromised devices—**end-of-support (EoS) models lacking Secure Boot**—were vulnerable to **full system takeover**, including **root-level arbitrary code execution**. The campaign demonstrated **advanced operational security**, with malware designed to **survive reboots, suppress syslogs, and bypass VPN authentication**. While no direct evidence confirmed **large-scale data breaches**, the **targeting of government infrastructure** and **use of nation-state tools** suggest **high strategic impact**, potentially threatening **national security, critical services, and diplomatic stability**. The attack’s **sophistication and persistence mechanisms** indicate a **long-term espionage or sabotage intent**, with risks extending beyond Cisco to **broader supply-chain and geopolitical consequences**.
Description: Hackers, specifically the **ArcaneDoor** group linked to Russian state actors, exploited zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-20353 and CVE-2024-20359) in **Cisco’s Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and Firepower Threat Defense (FTD)** software—critical components of U.S. federal cyber infrastructure. The breach, detected on **September 26, 2025**, allowed attackers to execute **remote denial-of-service (DoS) attacks** via infinite loops and **escalate privileges from administrator to root access**, compromising hundreds of Cisco firewall devices used by U.S. government agencies. Classified documents were stolen, including intelligence on **espionage, fraud, money laundering, and foreign agent activities**, directly threatening national security. The attack follows a 2024 pattern where Cisco’s systems were repeatedly targeted, with CISA issuing emergency directives to mitigate further damage. The incident underscores systemic vulnerabilities in federal cyber defenses, with experts warning of escalating threats as other cybercriminal groups adopt ArcaneDoor’s tactics.
Description: Cisco has addressed a security flaw that allowed personal data to leak from the company's Professional Careers portal. Cisco clarifies that just a small amount of information connected to job applications was stolen from the mobile version of the website in its email notification of the issue to the impacted individuals. As to the security alert distributed by Cisco to its users, an erroneous security configuration on a third-party site following system repair was the cause of data leaking. The information leaked by Cisco comprises personal details such as name, password, email address, phone number, security question answers, professional profile and educational background, cover letter, resume content, and other details.
Description: Cisco hacked by Yanluowang ransomware gang, 2.8GB allegedly stolen. The compromised information includes cisco products or services, sensitive customer data or sensitive employee information, intellectual property, or supply chain operations. A redacted NDA agreement that was obtained in the attack was also supplied to BleepingComputer by the threat actors as evidence of the incident and a "hint" that they had infiltrated Cisco's network and taken files. They immediately took action to contain and eradicate the bad actors.
Description: In May 2022, Cisco fell victim to a **Yanluowang ransomware attack** orchestrated by Aleksey Olegovich Volkov, an initial access broker (IAB) who breached the company’s network by compromising a **Cisco employee’s Box folder**. While the attackers exfiltrated **non-sensitive files**, they failed to encrypt Cisco’s systems or successfully extort a ransom. However, the incident exposed critical vulnerabilities in Cisco’s security posture, revealing that threat actors could infiltrate corporate networks, steal credentials, and potentially deploy ransomware. The attack was part of a broader campaign targeting at least **eight U.S. companies**, with Volkov selling network access to Yanluowang operators, who then demanded ransoms ranging from **$300,000 to $15 million**. Although Cisco avoided financial loss or data encryption in this instance, the breach underscored the risks of **supply-chain attacks, credential theft, and ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operations**. The FBI’s investigation later tied Volkov to **LockBit ransomware** as well, highlighting his role in facilitating high-impact cybercrime.
Description: Cisco, a multinational technology conglomerate, was targeted by the **Yanluowang ransomware gang** in a sophisticated attack facilitated by Aleksey Volkov, an initial access broker. The group exploited network vulnerabilities to infiltrate Cisco’s systems, deploying ransomware that encrypted critical data and disrupted operations. While the article does not specify the exact financial or data losses Cisco incurred, the broader context of Yanluowang’s operations—including extortion demands, DDoS attacks, and threats to executives—suggests severe operational and reputational harm. The gang’s tactics often involved stealing sensitive corporate or customer data before encrypting systems, then demanding ransom payments under threat of public exposure or prolonged outages. Cisco’s inclusion among high-profile victims (alongside Walmart) underscores the attack’s strategic intent to cripple infrastructure and extract maximum financial gain. The involvement of a Russian national linked to defense ministry ties further elevates the attack’s geopolitical and cybersecurity significance, aligning with Yanluowang’s pattern of targeting Western enterprises with precision.
Description: Cisco has released security patches for multiple vulnerabilities in its Small Business RV Series router platform. This vulnerability could allow any remote attacker to gain complete control over the device without authentication. The attacker could execute arbitrary code, elevate privileges, run commands, bypass authentication protections, and retrieve and execute unsigned software if exploits the flaw.
Description: Over **48,800 internet-exposed Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) devices** remain vulnerable to two critical flaws (**CVE-2025-20333** and **CVE-2025-20362**), enabling **remote, unauthenticated arbitrary code execution** and unauthorized access to VPN endpoints. Exploitation began **before patches were available**, with threat actors deploying **shellcode loaders (Line Viper)** and **GRUB bootkits (RayInitiator)**. The U.S. **CISA issued an emergency directive**, mandating federal agencies to patch or disconnect affected devices within **24 hours**, while the **U.K.’s NCSC** confirmed active attacks. Despite warnings since **late August**, most exposed devices—primarily in the **U.S., U.K., Japan, and Germany**—remain unpatched, risking **full system compromise, lateral movement, and data exfiltration**. The lack of workarounds exacerbates the threat, leaving organizations vulnerable to **persistent access, malware deployment, and potential supply-chain attacks** if breached devices are used to pivot into corporate networks.
Description: A severe vulnerability in Cisco's networking equipment, identified as CVE-2018-0171, has been exploited by attackers, notably by the APT group Salt Typhoon. Despite a patch released in 2018, over 1,200 devices remain unpatched, providing an attack surface for unauthorized remote code execution and configuration theft. The attack chiefly involves using the Smart Install feature to extract sensitive data from networking devices, exacerbating the risk of further infiltrations and potentially catastrophic network breaches. This enduring security oversight, which notably affected telecommunications providers, exemplifies the danger legacy systems pose to the current technology infrastructure.
Description: **Critical Cisco Secure Email Gateway Vulnerability Exploited in Ongoing Attacks** Cisco has disclosed an active cyberattack campaign targeting vulnerabilities in its **Cisco Secure Email Gateway** and **Cisco Secure Email and Web Manager** appliances running **Cisco AsyncOS Software**. The flaw, tracked as **CVE-2025-20393** (CVSS 10.0), allows threat actors to execute arbitrary commands with **root privileges**, enabling full system compromise. The vulnerability affects both **physical and virtual instances** of the appliances when the **Spam Quarantine feature** is enabled and exposed to the internet—a configuration **not enabled by default** per Cisco’s deployment guidelines. Cisco Secure Email Cloud remains unaffected, and there is no evidence of exploitation targeting **Cisco Secure Web**. ### **Attack Details & Timeline** The campaign was first detected through a **Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) case**, with Cisco Talos confirming active exploitation. Attackers exploited exposed ports to gain **unauthorized root access**, disable security tools, and establish **persistence mechanisms** for long-term control. Compromised appliances may require a full rebuild to remove embedded threats. ### **Mitigation & Hardening Measures** Cisco has stated that **no direct workarounds** exist for CVE-2025-20393. Organizations are advised to: - **Restrict appliance access** to trusted hosts and avoid direct internet exposure. - **Deploy behind firewalls**, filtering traffic to allow only authorized communication. - **Separate mail and management interfaces** to limit internal access risks. - **Monitor web logs** and forward them to external servers for analysis. - **Disable unnecessary services** (HTTP, FTP) and enforce **SSL/TLS with trusted certificates**. - **Upgrade to the latest AsyncOS release** and implement **strong authentication** (SAML, LDAP). ### **Broader Impact** The incident highlights risks posed by **misconfigured network services**, emphasizing the need for **immediate exposure assessment**, access restrictions, and continuous monitoring. Organizations should consult **Cisco TAC** if compromise is suspected.
Description: Cisco disclosed **CVE-2025-20265**, a **critical (CVSS 10.0) remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability** in its **Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) Software**, affecting versions **7.0.7 and 7.7.0** when **RADIUS authentication** is enabled. The flaw stems from **improper input validation** during RADIUS credential processing, allowing **unauthenticated attackers** to inject and execute **arbitrary shell commands with high-level privileges** remotely. No authentication or user interaction is required, making it highly exploitable.The vulnerability poses a **severe risk** as it enables full system compromise, potentially leading to **lateral movement, data exfiltration, or complete takeover of firewall management infrastructure**. While no **public exploitation** has been reported yet, the lack of workarounds (beyond disabling RADIUS) and the **critical severity** demand **immediate patching**. Cisco has released fixes but warns that mitigation requires **disabling RADIUS**, which may disrupt operational workflows.The flaw was discovered internally, underscoring the **proactive threat** of unpatched enterprise firewall systems. Organizations failing to patch risk **catastrophic breaches**, including **unauthorized access to sensitive networks, credential theft, or downstream attacks on connected systems**.
Description: A security researcher has published a blog post demonstrating a complete exploit chain for CVE-2025-20281, a critical unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated, remote attackers to upload arbitrary files to the target system and execute them with root privileges. The issue stems from unsafe deserialization and command injection in the enableStrongSwanTunnel() method. Although hotfixes were made available, Cisco urged users to update to 3.3 Patch 7 and 3.4 Patch 2 to address both vulnerabilities. On July 22, 2025, Cisco marked both CVE-2025-20281 and CVE-2025-20337 as actively exploited in attacks, urging admins to apply the security updates as soon as possible.
Description: In April 2024, the China-linked APT group Velvet Ant exploited zero-day vulnerability CVE-2024-20399 in Cisco switches to deploy custom malware, gaining control over the network devices. Attackers with valid administrator credentials executed commands as root, bypassing security measures and installing the 'VELVETSHELL' malware for persistent access and espionage. The malware granted capabilities for command execution, file management, and creating traffic tunnels, compromising the integrity of Cisco's network infrastructures and potentially leading to data exfiltration.
Description: Splunk has suffered a security incident due to two separate high-severity vulnerabilities. The first vulnerability enables RCE, allowing low-privileged users to execute arbitrary code through malicious file uploads, affecting Splunk Enterprise and Splunk Cloud Platform before certain versions. The second vulnerability affects the Splunk Secure Gateway app, where users can search with higher-privileged permissions, leading to potential unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information. Both issues have been patched, with suggested updates provided to Splunk users to remediate the risk. The security flaws highlight the critical importance of maintaining updated systems and monitoring access control within corporate environments to prevent data breaches and maintain operational integrity.


No incidents recorded for Sourcefire, part of Cisco in 2025.
No incidents recorded for Sourcefire, part of Cisco in 2025.
No incidents recorded for Sourcefire, part of Cisco in 2025.
SPC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries

Sourcefire, Inc. (Nasdaq:FIRE), a world leader in intelligent cybersecurity solutions, is transforming the way global mid- to large-size organizations and government agencies manage and minimize network security risks. With solutions from the network to the endpoint, Sourcefire provides customers with Agile Security that is as dynamic as the real world it protects and the attackers against which it defends. Trusted for more than 10 years, Sourcefire has been consistently recognized for its innovation and industry leadership with dozens of patents, world-class research, and award-winning technology. Today, the name Sourcefire has grown synonymous with innovation, security intelligence and agile end-to-end security infrastructure. For more information about Sourcefire, please visit www.sourcefire.com. For more on our product performance, see NSS Labs' results, summarized here: http://blog.sourcefire.com/2012/04/sourcefire-firepower-bigger-stronger.html.

Palo Alto Networks, the global cybersecurity leader, is shaping the cloud-centric future with technology that is transforming the way people and organizations operate. Our mission is to be the cybersecurity partner of choice, protecting our digital way of life. We help address the world's greatest s

## Our core business We manage linux / unix server infrastructures and build the efficient and secure networking environments using hardware cutting edge technologies suited to the needs of the project and the client. We believe in quality, opposed to quantity. Our company consists of highly

CrowdStrike (Nasdaq: CRWD), a global cybersecurity leader, has redefined modern security with the world’s most advanced cloud-native platform for protecting critical areas of enterprise risk — endpoints and cloud workloads, identity and data. Powered by the CrowdStrike Security Cloud and world-clas
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The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has issued a strong warning regarding critical vulnerabilities in Cisco's...
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has identified ongoing cyber threats targeting Cisco Adaptive Security...
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has issued a critical alert regarding federal agencies.
Cisco is under pressure from the U.S. government over critical firewall flaws that may have allowed for a nation-state backed breach.
Nearly 50,000 Cisco firewall devices with recently disclosed vulnerabilities are connected to the internet, according to new data.
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued Emergency Directive 25-03 in response to an advanced threat actor...
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has issued Emergency Directive 25-03 in response to an ongoing and severe...
CISA has issued Emergency Directive ED 25-03: Identify and Mitigate Potential Compromise of Cisco Devices to address vulnerabilities in...
According to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, hackers are actively targeting flaws in Cisco Adaptive Security...

Explore insights on cybersecurity incidents, risk posture, and Rankiteo's assessments.
The official website of Sourcefire, part of Cisco is http://www.sourcefire.com.
According to Rankiteo, Sourcefire, part of Cisco’s AI-generated cybersecurity score is 750, reflecting their Fair security posture.
According to Rankiteo, Sourcefire, part of Cisco currently holds 0 security badges, indicating that no recognized compliance certifications are currently verified for the organization.
According to Rankiteo, Sourcefire, part of Cisco is not certified under SOC 2 Type 1.
According to Rankiteo, Sourcefire, part of Cisco does not hold a SOC 2 Type 2 certification.
According to Rankiteo, Sourcefire, part of Cisco is not listed as GDPR compliant.
According to Rankiteo, Sourcefire, part of Cisco does not currently maintain PCI DSS compliance.
According to Rankiteo, Sourcefire, part of Cisco is not compliant with HIPAA regulations.
According to Rankiteo,Sourcefire, part of Cisco is not certified under ISO 27001, indicating the absence of a formally recognized information security management framework.
Sourcefire, part of Cisco operates primarily in the Computer and Network Security industry.
Sourcefire, part of Cisco employs approximately 75 people worldwide.
Sourcefire, part of Cisco presently has no subsidiaries across any sectors.
Sourcefire, part of Cisco’s official LinkedIn profile has approximately 17,596 followers.
Sourcefire, part of Cisco is classified under the NAICS code 541514, which corresponds to Others.
Yes, Sourcefire, part of Cisco has an official profile on Crunchbase, which can be accessed here: https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/sourcefire.
Yes, Sourcefire, part of Cisco maintains an official LinkedIn profile, which is actively utilized for branding and talent engagement, which can be accessed here: https://www.linkedin.com/company/sourcefire.
As of December 21, 2025, Rankiteo reports that Sourcefire, part of Cisco has experienced 18 cybersecurity incidents.
Sourcefire, part of Cisco has an estimated 3,172 peer or competitor companies worldwide.
Incident Types: The types of cybersecurity incidents that have occurred include Data Leak, Cyber Attack, Vulnerability, Ransomware and Breach.
Total Financial Loss: The total financial loss from these incidents is estimated to be $13.07 million.
Detection and Response: The company detects and responds to cybersecurity incidents through an containment measures with took action to contain and eradicate the bad actors, and remediation measures with patches provided to users, remediation measures with suggested updates to remediate risk, and containment measures with apply security updates, and remediation measures with update to 3.3 patch 7 and 3.4 patch 2, and and containment measures with disable radius authentication (switch to ldap/saml/local accounts), and remediation measures with apply free software updates provided by cisco, and communication strategy with public advisory via cisco’s august 2025 semiannual security advisory bundled publication, communication strategy with urgent recommendation for immediate patching, and and third party assistance with u.k. national cyber security centre (ncsc), third party assistance with canadian centre for cyber security, and containment measures with cisco patches for cve-2025-20362, cve-2025-20333, cve-2025-20363, containment measures with urgent advisories for updates, containment measures with disabling vpn web services on vulnerable devices, and remediation measures with firmware analysis to detect rayinitiator/line viper, remediation measures with replacement of end-of-support (eos) devices, remediation measures with implementation of secure boot/trust anchor on newer models, and communication strategy with public advisories by ncsc (2025-09-25), communication strategy with cisco security bulletins, communication strategy with canadian centre for cyber security alerts, and enhanced monitoring with recommended for asa/ftd devices, and and third party assistance with five eyes intelligence alliance, third party assistance with cisco internal teams, and containment measures with urgent patching of cisco asa vulnerabilities, containment measures with emergency directives (e.g., u.s. cisa's midnight deadline for federal agencies), and communication strategy with public warnings by cse (canada), cisa (u.s.), ncsc (uk), communication strategy with media statements (e.g., cbc news), communication strategy with collaboration with five eyes alliance, and enhanced monitoring with recommended (implied by urgency of patching and detection evasion concerns), and and third party assistance with cisco cybersecurity experts, and containment measures with cisa directive to identify affected devices, containment measures with data collection and threat assessment using cisa tools, and remediation measures with patching vulnerabilities (cve-2024-20353, cve-2024-20359), remediation measures with addressing cyber vulnerabilities in cisco devices, and communication strategy with public disclosure via bloomberg, communication strategy with cisa advisories, and enhanced monitoring with use of cisa cybersecurity tools for threat assessment, and incident response plan activated with cisco security advisory (2024-09-25), incident response plan activated with cisa emergency directive (24-hour patching mandate), incident response plan activated with ncsc (uk) threat report, and third party assistance with the shadowserver foundation (threat monitoring), third party assistance with greynoise (early warning scans), and containment measures with restrict vpn web interface exposure, containment measures with disconnect end-of-support (eos) asa devices, containment measures with increase logging/monitoring for suspicious vpn logins, and remediation measures with apply cisco patches for cve-2025-20333 and cve-2025-20362, remediation measures with follow cisco hardening guidelines, and communication strategy with cisco security advisories [1, 2], communication strategy with cisa emergency directive, communication strategy with ncsc threat report, and enhanced monitoring with monitor for crafted http requests, enhanced monitoring with track suspicious vpn logins, and third party assistance with fbi investigation, third party assistance with symantec (threat intelligence), third party assistance with kaspersky (decryption tool), and and remediation measures with kaspersky released free decrypter (2022), and and third party assistance with fbi, third party assistance with international law enforcement (italy), and and containment measures with restricting appliance access to known, trusted hosts, containment measures with deploying appliances behind firewalls, containment measures with separating mail and management network interfaces, containment measures with disabling unnecessary network services (http, ftp), containment measures with using ssl/tls with trusted certificates, and remediation measures with upgrading to the latest cisco asyncos software release, remediation measures with rebuilding compromised appliances, remediation measures with implementing strong authentication methods (saml, ldap), and recovery measures with monitoring web logs and sending logs to external servers, recovery measures with reviewing deployment guides for security best practices, and network segmentation with separating mail and management network interfaces, and enhanced monitoring with sending logs to external servers for post-event analysis..
Title: Cisco Small Business RV Series Router Vulnerabilities
Description: Cisco has released security patches for multiple vulnerabilities in its Small Business RV Series router platform. This vulnerability could allow any remote attacker to gain complete control over the device without authentication. The attacker could execute arbitrary code, elevate privileges, run commands, bypass authentication protections, and retrieve and execute unsigned software if exploits the flaw.
Type: Vulnerability Exploitation
Attack Vector: RemoteUnauthenticated
Vulnerability Exploited: Multiple vulnerabilities in Cisco Small Business RV Series routers
Title: Cisco Hacked by Yanluowang Ransomware Gang
Description: Cisco experienced a ransomware attack by the Yanluowang gang, resulting in the alleged theft of 2.8GB of data.
Type: Ransomware
Threat Actor: Yanluowang ransomware gang
Motivation: Data theft and ransom
Title: Cisco Data Leak by Yanluowang Ransomware Gang
Description: Cisco was targeted in a data leak by the Yanluowang ransomware gang in September 2022. The gang leaked data stolen from the company network during a cyberattack in May. The stolen data included non-sensitive files from the employee’s Box folder and thousands of files amounting to 55GB, including classified documents, technical schematics, and source code.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2022-09
Type: Data Leak
Threat Actor: Yanluowang Ransomware Gang
Title: Cisco Professional Careers Portal Data Leak
Description: Cisco has addressed a security flaw that allowed personal data to leak from the company's Professional Careers portal. The data leak occurred due to an erroneous security configuration on a third-party site following system repair.
Type: Data Leak
Attack Vector: Erroneous Security Configuration
Vulnerability Exploited: Security Misconfiguration
Title: Velvet Ant APT Group Exploits Cisco Switches
Description: In April 2024, the China-linked APT group Velvet Ant exploited zero-day vulnerability CVE-2024-20399 in Cisco switches to deploy custom malware, gaining control over the network devices. Attackers with valid administrator credentials executed commands as root, bypassing security measures and installing the 'VELVETSHELL' malware for persistent access and espionage. The malware granted capabilities for command execution, file management, and creating traffic tunnels, compromising the integrity of Cisco's network infrastructures and potentially leading to data exfiltration.
Date Detected: April 2024
Type: Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
Attack Vector: Zero-day vulnerability exploitation
Vulnerability Exploited: CVE-2024-20399
Threat Actor: Velvet Ant
Motivation: Espionage
Title: Splunk Security Incident
Description: Splunk has suffered a security incident due to two separate high-severity vulnerabilities. The first vulnerability enables RCE, allowing low-privileged users to execute arbitrary code through malicious file uploads, affecting Splunk Enterprise and Splunk Cloud Platform before certain versions. The second vulnerability affects the Splunk Secure Gateway app, where users can search with higher-privileged permissions, leading to potential unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information. Both issues have been patched, with suggested updates provided to Splunk users to remediate the risk. The security flaws highlight the critical importance of maintaining updated systems and monitoring access control within corporate environments to prevent data breaches and maintain operational integrity.
Type: Security Vulnerabilities
Attack Vector: Malicious File UploadsPrivilege Escalation
Vulnerability Exploited: Remote Code Execution (RCE)Unauthorized Disclosure of Sensitive Information
Title: CVE-2018-0171 Exploitation in Cisco Networking Equipment
Description: A severe vulnerability in Cisco's networking equipment, identified as CVE-2018-0171, has been exploited by attackers, notably by the APT group Salt Typhoon. Despite a patch released in 2018, over 1,200 devices remain unpatched, providing an attack surface for unauthorized remote code execution and configuration theft. The attack chiefly involves using the Smart Install feature to extract sensitive data from networking devices, exacerbating the risk of further infiltrations and potentially catastrophic network breaches. This enduring security oversight, which notably affected telecommunications providers, exemplifies the danger legacy systems pose to the current technology infrastructure.
Type: Vulnerability Exploitation
Attack Vector: Remote Code Execution, Configuration Theft
Vulnerability Exploited: CVE-2018-0171
Threat Actor: Salt Typhoon
Motivation: Data Theft, Unauthorized Access
Title: Cisco Systems Data Breach
Description: A data breach occurred at Cisco Systems, Inc. due to a security setting error on the Cisco Professional Careers mobile website, potentially exposing job application-related personal information.
Date Detected: 2016-08-18
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2016-10-25
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Security Setting Error
Vulnerability Exploited: Security Setting Error
Title: Critical Vulnerabilities in Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE)
Description: Security researcher Bobby Gould has published a blog post demonstrating a complete exploit chain for CVE-2025-20281, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE). The critical vulnerability was first disclosed on June 25, 2025, with Cisco warning that it impacts ISE and ISE-PIC versions 3.3 and 3.4, allowing unauthenticated, remote attackers to upload arbitrary files to the target system and execute them with root privileges. The issue stems from unsafe deserialization and command injection in the enableStrongSwanTunnel() method. Three weeks later, the vendor added one more flaw to the same bulletin, CVE-2025-20337, which relates to the same flaw but is now broken down into two parts, CVE-2025-20281 (command injection) and CVE-2025-20337 (deserialization). Although hotfixes were previously made available, Cisco urged users to update to 3.3 Patch 7 and 3.4 Patch 2 to address both vulnerabilities. On July 22, 2025, Cisco marked both CVE-2025-20281 and CVE-2025-20337 as actively exploited in attacks, urging admins to apply the security updates as soon as possible.
Date Detected: 2025-06-25
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2025-06-25
Date Resolved: 2025-07-22
Type: Remote Code Execution
Attack Vector: Unauthenticated remote attack
Vulnerability Exploited: CVE-2025-20281CVE-2025-20337
Title: Critical Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) Software (CVE-2025-20265)
Description: Cisco has disclosed a critical security vulnerability (CVE-2025-20265, CVSS 10.0) in its Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) Software, allowing unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands with high-level privileges remotely. The flaw resides in the RADIUS subsystem during the authentication phase, where improper input validation enables command injection via specially crafted credentials. No authentication is required, and exploitation is possible over the network. Affected versions include Cisco Secure FMC Software 7.0.7 and 7.7.0 when RADIUS authentication is enabled. No workarounds exist; patching or disabling RADIUS authentication (switching to LDAP/SAML/local accounts) are the only mitigations. Cisco has released free updates and urges immediate action. No public exploitation has been reported.
Date Publicly Disclosed: August 2025
Type: Vulnerability Disclosure
Attack Vector: NetworkRADIUS Authentication ExploitationUnauthenticated
Vulnerability Exploited: Cve Id: CVE-2025-20265, Cvss Score: 10.0, Component: RADIUS Subsystem (Authentication Phase), Root Cause: Insufficient Input Validation, 7.0.77.7.0RADIUS authentication enabled for web/SSH management
Title: Exploitation of Cisco Firewall Zero-Day Vulnerabilities by ArcaneDoor (UAT4356/Storm-1849) to Deploy RayInitiator and LINE VIPER Malware
Description: The U.K. National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) revealed that threat actors (suspected China-linked hacking group UAT4356/Storm-1849, aka ArcaneDoor) exploited zero-day vulnerabilities in Cisco ASA 5500-X Series firewalls to deploy previously undocumented malware families (RayInitiator and LINE VIPER). The campaign targeted government agencies, leveraging memory corruption bugs (CVE-2025-20362, CVE-2025-20333) to bypass authentication, execute commands, and exfiltrate data. The attackers used advanced evasion techniques, including disabling logging, intercepting CLI commands, and crashing devices to hinder analysis. Persistence was achieved via ROMMON modifications on devices lacking Secure Boot/Trust Anchor. A third critical flaw (CVE-2025-20363) was patched but not exploited in the wild.
Date Detected: 2025-05
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2025-09-25
Type: Zero-day exploitation
Attack Vector: Exploitation of CVE-2025-20362 (CVSS 6.5)Exploitation of CVE-2025-20333 (CVSS 9.9)Multi-stage bootkit (RayInitiator)User-mode shellcode loader (LINE VIPER)ROMMON modification for persistenceWebVPN/HTTPS and ICMP/TCP C2 communication
Vulnerability Exploited: CVE-2025-20362 (Memory corruption in Cisco ASA Software)CVE-2025-20333 (Authentication bypass in Cisco ASA Software)Lack of Secure Boot/Trust Anchor in ASA 5500-X SeriesEnd-of-support (EoS) devices (ASA 5500-X Series)
Threat Actor: ArcaneDoorUAT4356Storm-1849Suspected China-linked state-sponsored group
Motivation: EspionageData exfiltrationPersistence in government networks
Title: Advanced Espionage Campaign Targeting Cisco ASA Devices (ArcaneDoor)
Description: Government cyber agencies worldwide are responding to a sophisticated espionage campaign targeting Cisco's adaptive security appliances (ASA), widely used for VPNs by remote workers. The threat actor, linked to the ArcaneDoor campaign, exploited vulnerabilities to implant malware, execute commands, and potentially exfiltrate data. Critical infrastructure sectors, including governments, academia, and research facilities, are urged to patch vulnerabilities immediately. The attack is described as state-sponsored and highly evasive, prompting emergency directives from the U.S. CISA and warnings from Canada's CSE and the UK's NCSC.
Date Detected: 2024-05
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-06-20
Type: Espionage
Attack Vector: Vulnerability Exploitation (Cisco ASA)Malware ImplantationCommand ExecutionPotential Data Exfiltration
Vulnerability Exploited: Unspecified Cisco ASA Vulnerabilities (ArcaneDoor Campaign)
Threat Actor: State-sponsored actor (high confidence; linked to ArcaneDoor campaign)
Motivation: Espionage
Title: Hackers hit the United States: Critical federal infrastructure compromised via Cisco networking equipment breach
Description: Hackers breached Cisco networking equipment belonging to several US government agencies on September 26, 2025. The attack, attributed to the ArcaneDoor hacker group, targeted critical U.S. federal cyber infrastructure, including Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) software. Zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-20353 and CVE-2024-20359) were exploited, enabling remote denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and privilege escalation from administrator to root access. The breach follows prior incidents in 2024 and a separate August 2025 hack of U.S. federal courts by Russian actors, where classified documents were stolen.
Date Detected: 2025-09-26
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2025-09-28
Type: Cyberattack
Attack Vector: Exploitation of Zero-Day Vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-20353, CVE-2024-20359)Remote Access
Vulnerability Exploited: CVE-2024-20353 (Infinite Loop DoS)CVE-2024-20359 (Privilege Escalation: Admin → Root)
Threat Actor: ArcaneDoor Hacker GroupRussian Hackers (for federal courts breach)
Motivation: EspionageCyber WarfareFinancial Gain (potential sale of exploit methods)
Title: Active Exploitation of Cisco ASA and FTD Vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-20333, CVE-2025-20362)
Description: Roughly 50,000 Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) appliances exposed on the public web are vulnerable to two actively exploited vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20362). These flaws enable arbitrary code execution and unauthorized access to restricted VPN endpoints. Exploitation began before patches were available, with no workarounds existing. Over 48,800 internet-exposed instances remain unpatched as of September 29, 2024. Threat actors have deployed malware such as 'Line Viper' (shellcode loader) and 'RayInitiator' (GRUB bootkit). CISA issued an emergency directive mandating federal agencies to patch or disconnect affected devices within 24 hours.
Date Detected: 2024-08-01
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-09-25
Type: Vulnerability Exploitation
Attack Vector: Remote Code Execution (RCE)Unauthenticated Access to VPN EndpointsCrafted HTTP Requests
Vulnerability Exploited: CVE-2025-20333CVE-2025-20362
Motivation: Opportunistic ExploitationPotential Data TheftMalware Distribution
Title: Yanluowang Ransomware Attacks Facilitated by Initial Access Broker Aleksey Volkov
Description: A Russian national, Aleksey Olegovich Volkov (25), acted as an initial access broker for the Yanluowang ransomware gang, infiltrating networks of at least eight U.S.-based organizations (including banks, telecoms, and engineering firms) between July 2021 and November 2022. Volkov sold network access to the gang in exchange for a cut of ransom payments (totaling over $256,000 from two confirmed payouts of ~$1.5M). He also conducted DDoS attacks and threatening tactics to coerce victims. Volkov was arrested in Rome in 2023, extradited to the U.S., and agreed to a plea deal in 2025, including $9M in restitution. The Yanluowang group disbanded in late 2022 after its leak site was hacked, revealing its members were likely Russian (despite masquerading as Chinese).
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2025-10-29
Type: Ransomware
Attack Vector: Exploited Vulnerabilities (unspecified)Phishing/Social Engineering (likely)DDoS AttacksThreatening Calls to Executives
Threat Actor: Name: Aleksey Olegovich Volkov (aka 'chubaka.kor')Affiliation: ['Yanluowang Ransomware Gang', 'LockBit Ransomware Gang (alleged communication)']Nationality: RussianRole: Initial Access BrokerAliases: ['chubaka.kor', 'Alekseq Olegovi3 Volkov']Birthdate: 2000-03-20Cryptocurrency Wallets: ['Linked to Russian passport-verified account']Email: [email protected] Id: [email protected]
Motivation: Financial Gain (ransomware proceeds, access sales)
Title: Yanluowang Ransomware Attacks Facilitated by Initial Access Broker Aleksey Olegovich Volkov
Description: A Russian national, Aleksey Olegovich Volkov (aliases: 'chubaka.kor', 'nets'), acted as an initial access broker (IAB) for Yanluowang ransomware attacks targeting at least eight U.S. companies between July 2021 and November 2022. Volkov breached corporate networks, sold access to the ransomware group, and received a percentage of ransom payments totaling $1.5 million from two victims. He was linked to attacks on companies across multiple U.S. states, including a Philadelphia-based company, an engineering firm, a California company, a Michigan bank, an Illinois business, a Georgia company, an Ohio telecommunications provider, and a business in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Volkov was arrested in Italy in January 2024, extradited to the U.S., and faces up to 53 years in prison along with $9.1 million in restitution.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-10-29
Type: ransomware
Attack Vector: credential theftnetwork intrusionsocial engineering (potential)exploitation of vulnerabilities (unspecified)
Threat Actor: Name: Aleksey Olegovich VolkovAliases: ['chubaka.kor', 'nets', '[email protected]', '[email protected]']Affiliation: ['Yanluowang ransomware group', 'potential link to LockBit ransomware gang']Nationality: RussianStatus: arrested (January 2024), extradited to U.S., pleaded guilty (October 29, 2024)
Motivation: financial gain
Title: Cisco Secure Email Gateway and Web Manager Appliances Exploited via CVE-2025-20393
Description: Cisco has identified an ongoing cyberattack campaign exploiting vulnerabilities in Cisco AsyncOS Software for Cisco Secure Email Gateway and Cisco Secure Email and Web Manager appliances. The attack allows threat actors to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges, implant persistence mechanisms, and maintain long-term control over compromised appliances. The vulnerability (CVE-2025-20393) is critical with a CVSS 10.0 rating and affects appliances with the Spam Quarantine feature enabled and exposed to the internet.
Type: Cyberattack
Attack Vector: Exploiting misconfigured Spam Quarantine feature and exposed ports
Vulnerability Exploited: CVE-2025-20393
Common Attack Types: The most common types of attacks the company has faced is Vulnerability.
Identification of Attack Vectors: The company identifies the attack vectors used in incidents through Amazon Web Services, Cisco switches, Smart Install Feature, CVE-2025-20362 and CVE-2025-20333 in Cisco ASA VPN web services, Vulnerabilities in Cisco ASA devices (legacy systems targeted), Cisco ASA/FTD vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-20353, CVE-2024-20359), Exposed VPN Web InterfacesCrafted HTTP Requests Targeting CVE-2025-20333/CVE-2025-20362, Exploited Vulnerabilities (unspecified)Potential Phishing, corporate network breaches (method unspecified) and Exposed Spam Quarantine feature and ports.

Systems Affected: Cisco Small Business RV Series routers

Data Compromised: Cisco products or services, Sensitive customer data, Sensitive employee information, Intellectual property, Supply chain operations

Data Compromised: Non-sensitive files, Classified documents, Technical schematics, Source code

Data Compromised: Name, Password, Email address, Phone number, Security question answers, Professional profile, Educational background, Cover letter, Resume content
Systems Affected: Professional Careers portal

Systems Affected: Cisco switches

Systems Affected: Splunk EnterpriseSplunk Cloud PlatformSplunk Secure Gateway app

Data Compromised: Sensitive Data
Systems Affected: Networking Devices

Data Compromised: Names, Addresses, Emails, Phone numbers, Other sensitive data
Systems Affected: Cisco Professional Careers mobile website

Systems Affected: Cisco ISE and ISE-PIC versions 3.3 and 3.4

Systems Affected: Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) Software (versions 7.0.7, 7.7.0 with RADIUS enabled)
Operational Impact: Potential disruption if RADIUS authentication is disabled (requires reconfiguration to LDAP/SAML/local accounts)Emergency patching may require maintenance windows
Brand Reputation Impact: High (critical vulnerability in enterprise firewall infrastructure)

Data Compromised: Potential exfiltration from government agencies, Vpn credentials (via aaa bypass), Cli commands (harvested), Packet captures
Systems Affected: Cisco ASA 5500-X Series (5512-X, 5515-X, 5525-X, 5545-X, 5555-X, 5585-X)Devices running Cisco ASA Software 9.12 or 9.14 with VPN web services enabled
Downtime: ['Intentional device crashes to evade analysis', 'Delayed reboots triggered by LINE VIPER']
Operational Impact: Compromised firewall integrityBypassed authentication (AAA)Suppressed syslog messagesModified CLI commands (e.g., copy, verify)
Brand Reputation Impact: Potential loss of trust in Cisco ASA security productsGovernment agencies targeted
Identity Theft Risk: ['Potential risk if VPN credentials were exfiltrated']

Systems Affected: Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA)VPN-enabled systems used by remote workers
Operational Impact: High (potential data exfiltration, command execution, and malware persistence in critical infrastructure sectors)
Brand Reputation Impact: Moderate to High (urgent global warnings issued by cyber agencies)

Data Compromised: Classified documents (espionage, fraud, money laundering, foreign agent activities)
Systems Affected: Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA)Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) softwareHundreds of Cisco firewall devicesU.S. federal courts computer systems
Operational Impact: Disruption of federal cyber infrastructurePotential loss of sensitive government data
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of public trust in U.S. federal cybersecurityReputational damage to Cisco

Systems Affected: 50,000 (48,800 confirmed unpatched as of 2024-09-29)
Operational Impact: Potential Unauthorized VPN AccessMalware Infection (Line Viper, RayInitiator)Risk of Lateral Movement
Brand Reputation Impact: Potential Erosion of Trust in Cisco Security ProductsRegulatory Scrutiny
Legal Liabilities: Non-Compliance with CISA Emergency Directive for Federal AgenciesPotential Violations of Data Protection Laws

Financial Loss: $1.5M+ (confirmed ransom payments) + $9M (restitution agreed in plea deal)
Operational Impact: System LockoutsDDoS DisruptionsExecutive Threats
Brand Reputation Impact: High (targeted high-profile U.S. firms)Associated with extortion tactics
Legal Liabilities: Plea deal for hacking, extortion, and theft chargesDecades-long prison sentence pending

Financial Loss: $9,167,198.19 (restitution amount)
Legal Liabilities: $9,167,198.19 (restitution) + potential fines
Identity Theft Risk: True

Systems Affected: Cisco Secure Email Gateway and Cisco Secure Email and Web Manager appliances
Operational Impact: Unauthorized root access, persistence mechanisms, and potential data exfiltration
Brand Reputation Impact: Potential reputational damage due to system compromise
Average Financial Loss: The average financial loss per incident is $725.96 thousand.
Commonly Compromised Data Types: The types of data most commonly compromised in incidents are Cisco Products Or Services, Sensitive Customer Data, Sensitive Employee Information, Intellectual Property, Supply Chain Operations, , Non-Sensitive Files, Classified Documents, Technical Schematics, Source Code, , Personal Details, Professional Profile, Educational Background, Cover Letter, Resume Content, , Sensitive Data, Personal Information, , Vpn Authentication Data, Cli Command History, Network Packet Captures, Potential Government Data, , Classified Government Documents, Espionage-Related Data, Fraud/Money Laundering Records, Foreign Agent Activities, , Corporate Network Credentials, Stolen Data (Unspecified), Non-Sensitive Files (Cisco Box Folder) and .

Entity Name: Cisco
Entity Type: Organization
Industry: Technology

Entity Name: Cisco
Entity Type: Organization
Industry: Technology

Entity Name: Splunk
Entity Type: Corporation
Industry: Software

Entity Name: Cisco
Entity Type: Technology Company
Industry: Networking Equipment

Entity Name: Cisco Systems, Inc.
Entity Type: Company
Industry: Technology
Location: California

Entity Name: Cisco
Entity Type: Vendor
Industry: Technology

Entity Name: Cisco Systems, Inc.
Entity Type: Corporation
Industry: Networking Hardware, Cybersecurity
Location: San Jose, California, USA
Size: Large Enterprise

Entity Name: Multiple government agencies (unspecified)
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Public sector
Location: United KingdomCanada (advisory issued)

Entity Name: Cisco Systems
Entity Type: Corporation
Industry: Networking/IT Security
Location: Global
Size: Large enterprise
Customers Affected: Users of Cisco ASA 5500-X Series devices

Entity Name: Cisco Systems, Inc.
Entity Type: Technology Company
Industry: Networking and Cybersecurity
Location: Global (headquartered in San Jose, California, USA)
Size: Large (Enterprise)
Customers Affected: Critical infrastructure sectors (municipal, provincial, territorial governments; academia; research facilities; organizations using Cisco ASA for VPNs)

Entity Name: Critical Infrastructure Sectors (Canada, U.S., UK, and Five Eyes Allies)
Entity Type: Government, Academia, Research Facilities
Industry: Multiple (Public Sector, Education, Research)
Location: CanadaUnited StatesUnited KingdomFive Eyes Alliance Nations

Entity Name: United States Federal Government
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Public Sector
Location: United States

Entity Name: U.S. Cybersecurity and Information Technology Infrastructure Agency (CISA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States

Entity Name: U.S. Federal Courts
Entity Type: Judicial Branch
Industry: Legal
Location: United States

Entity Name: Cisco Systems
Entity Type: Corporation
Industry: Networking & Cybersecurity
Location: United States (Global)
Customers Affected: U.S. government agencies (hundreds of firewall devices)

Entity Name: Cisco Systems, Inc.
Entity Type: Technology Vendor
Industry: Networking and Cybersecurity
Location: Global
Size: Large Enterprise
Customers Affected: 50,000+ (exposed ASA/FTD appliances)

Entity Name: Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) Agencies (U.S.)
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Public Sector
Location: United States

Entity Name: Organizations Using Cisco ASA/FTD (Global)
Entity Type: Private Sector, Public Sector, Critical Infrastructure
Industry: Multiple
Location: United States (19,200+ endpoints)United Kingdom (2,800)Japan (2,300)Germany (2,200)Russia (2,100)Canada (1,500)Denmark (1,200)

Entity Name: Unnamed Bank (Pennsylvania)
Entity Type: Financial Institution
Industry: Banking
Location: Pennsylvania, USA

Entity Name: Unnamed Telecommunications Company (California)
Entity Type: Private Company
Industry: Telecommunications
Location: California, USA

Entity Name: Unnamed Engineering Firm (Michigan)
Entity Type: Private Company
Industry: Engineering
Location: Michigan, USA

Entity Name: Unnamed Organization (Illinois)
Location: Illinois, USA

Entity Name: Unnamed Organization (Georgia)
Location: Georgia, USA

Entity Name: Cisco Systems
Entity Type: Public Company
Industry: Technology/Networking
Location: California, USA
Size: Large Enterprise

Entity Name: Walmart
Entity Type: Public Company
Industry: Retail
Location: Arkansas, USA
Size: Large Enterprise

Entity Name: Philadelphia-based company
Location: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.

Entity Name: Engineering firm
Industry: engineering
Location: 19 U.S. offices (exact locations unspecified)

Entity Name: Michigan bank
Entity Type: bank
Industry: financial services
Location: Michigan, U.S.

Entity Name: Ohio telecommunications provider
Entity Type: telecommunications
Industry: telecommunications
Location: Ohio, U.S.

Entity Name: Business in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Location: Eastern District of Pennsylvania, U.S.

Entity Name: Cisco
Entity Type: technology corporation
Industry: IT/Networking
Location: global (HQ: San Jose, California, U.S.)
Size: large enterprise

Entity Name: Cisco
Entity Type: Corporation
Industry: Technology/Networking
Location: Global
Size: Large

Containment Measures: Took action to contain and eradicate the bad actors

Remediation Measures: Patches provided to usersSuggested updates to remediate risk

Containment Measures: Apply security updates
Remediation Measures: Update to 3.3 Patch 7 and 3.4 Patch 2

Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Containment Measures: Disable RADIUS authentication (switch to LDAP/SAML/local accounts)
Remediation Measures: Apply free software updates provided by Cisco
Communication Strategy: Public advisory via Cisco’s August 2025 Semiannual Security Advisory Bundled PublicationUrgent recommendation for immediate patching

Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Third Party Assistance: U.K. National Cyber Security Centre (Ncsc), Canadian Centre For Cyber Security.
Containment Measures: Cisco patches for CVE-2025-20362, CVE-2025-20333, CVE-2025-20363Urgent advisories for updatesDisabling VPN web services on vulnerable devices
Remediation Measures: Firmware analysis to detect RayInitiator/LINE VIPERReplacement of end-of-support (EoS) devicesImplementation of Secure Boot/Trust Anchor on newer models
Communication Strategy: Public advisories by NCSC (2025-09-25)Cisco security bulletinsCanadian Centre for Cyber Security alerts
Enhanced Monitoring: Recommended for ASA/FTD devices

Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Third Party Assistance: Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance, Cisco Internal Teams.
Containment Measures: Urgent Patching of Cisco ASA VulnerabilitiesEmergency Directives (e.g., U.S. CISA's midnight deadline for federal agencies)
Communication Strategy: Public Warnings by CSE (Canada), CISA (U.S.), NCSC (UK)Media Statements (e.g., CBC News)Collaboration with Five Eyes Alliance
Enhanced Monitoring: Recommended (implied by urgency of patching and detection evasion concerns)

Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Third Party Assistance: Cisco Cybersecurity Experts.
Containment Measures: CISA directive to identify affected devicesData collection and threat assessment using CISA tools
Remediation Measures: Patching vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-20353, CVE-2024-20359)Addressing cyber vulnerabilities in Cisco devices
Communication Strategy: Public disclosure via BloombergCISA advisories
Enhanced Monitoring: Use of CISA cybersecurity tools for threat assessment

Incident Response Plan Activated: ['Cisco Security Advisory (2024-09-25)', 'CISA Emergency Directive (24-hour patching mandate)', 'NCSC (UK) Threat Report']
Third Party Assistance: The Shadowserver Foundation (Threat Monitoring), Greynoise (Early Warning Scans).
Containment Measures: Restrict VPN Web Interface ExposureDisconnect End-of-Support (EoS) ASA DevicesIncrease Logging/Monitoring for Suspicious VPN Logins
Remediation Measures: Apply Cisco Patches for CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20362Follow Cisco Hardening Guidelines
Communication Strategy: Cisco Security Advisories [1, 2]CISA Emergency DirectiveNCSC Threat Report
Enhanced Monitoring: Monitor for Crafted HTTP RequestsTrack Suspicious VPN Logins

Third Party Assistance: Fbi Investigation, Symantec (Threat Intelligence), Kaspersky (Decryption Tool).
Remediation Measures: Kaspersky released free decrypter (2022)

Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Third Party Assistance: Fbi, International Law Enforcement (Italy).

Containment Measures: Restricting appliance access to known, trusted hostsDeploying appliances behind firewallsSeparating mail and management network interfacesDisabling unnecessary network services (HTTP, FTP)Using SSL/TLS with trusted certificates
Remediation Measures: Upgrading to the latest Cisco AsyncOS Software releaseRebuilding compromised appliancesImplementing strong authentication methods (SAML, LDAP)
Recovery Measures: Monitoring web logs and sending logs to external serversReviewing deployment guides for security best practices
Network Segmentation: Separating mail and management network interfaces
Enhanced Monitoring: Sending logs to external servers for post-event analysis
Incident Response Plan: The company's incident response plan is described as Cisco Security Advisory (2024-09-25), CISA Emergency Directive (24-hour patching mandate), NCSC (UK) Threat Report, , .
Third-Party Assistance: The company involves third-party assistance in incident response through U.K. National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, , Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance, Cisco Internal Teams, , Cisco Cybersecurity Experts, , The Shadowserver Foundation (Threat Monitoring), Greynoise (Early Warning Scans), , FBI Investigation, Symantec (Threat Intelligence), Kaspersky (Decryption Tool), , FBI, international law enforcement (Italy), .

Type of Data Compromised: Cisco products or services, Sensitive customer data, Sensitive employee information, Intellectual property, Supply chain operations
Sensitivity of Data: High
Data Exfiltration: 2.8GB

Type of Data Compromised: Non-sensitive files, Classified documents, Technical schematics, Source code
Sensitivity of Data: non-sensitivehigh
File Types Exposed: documentsschematicssource code

Type of Data Compromised: Personal details, Professional profile, Educational background, Cover letter, Resume content
Personally Identifiable Information: nameemail addressphone numbersecurity question answers

Type of Data Compromised: Sensitive Data
Sensitivity of Data: High

Type of Data Compromised: Personal information
Sensitivity of Data: High
Personally Identifiable Information: namesaddressesemailsphone numbers

Type of Data Compromised: Vpn authentication data, Cli command history, Network packet captures, Potential government data
Sensitivity of Data: High (government agencies targeted)Potential classified information
Data Exfiltration: Likely (via LINE VIPER C2 channels)

Data Exfiltration: Potential (malware designed for exfiltration)

Type of Data Compromised: Classified government documents, Espionage-related data, Fraud/money laundering records, Foreign agent activities
Sensitivity of Data: High (Classified)

Data Exfiltration: Likely (based on ransomware MO)
Data Encryption: ['Yanluowang custom encryption (vulnerability found by Kaspersky)']

Type of Data Compromised: Corporate network credentials, Stolen data (unspecified), Non-sensitive files (cisco box folder)
Sensitivity of Data: low (Cisco case: non-sensitive files)high (credentials, corporate data)
Data Encryption: True

Data Exfiltration: Potential data exfiltration via covert channels
Prevention of Data Exfiltration: The company takes the following measures to prevent data exfiltration: Patches provided to users, Suggested updates to remediate risk, , Update to 3.3 Patch 7 and 3.4 Patch 2, Apply free software updates provided by Cisco, , Firmware analysis to detect RayInitiator/LINE VIPER, Replacement of end-of-support (EoS) devices, Implementation of Secure Boot/Trust Anchor on newer models, , Patching vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-20353, CVE-2024-20359), Addressing cyber vulnerabilities in Cisco devices, , Apply Cisco Patches for CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20362, Follow Cisco Hardening Guidelines, , Kaspersky released free decrypter (2022), , Upgrading to the latest Cisco AsyncOS Software release, Rebuilding compromised appliances, Implementing strong authentication methods (SAML, LDAP), .
Handling of PII Incidents: The company handles incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) through by took action to contain and eradicate the bad actors, , apply security updates, disable radius authentication (switch to ldap/saml/local accounts), , cisco patches for cve-2025-20362, cve-2025-20333, cve-2025-20363, urgent advisories for updates, disabling vpn web services on vulnerable devices, , urgent patching of cisco asa vulnerabilities, emergency directives (e.g., u.s. cisa's midnight deadline for federal agencies), , cisa directive to identify affected devices, data collection and threat assessment using cisa tools, , restrict vpn web interface exposure, disconnect end-of-support (eos) asa devices, increase logging/monitoring for suspicious vpn logins, , restricting appliance access to known, trusted hosts, deploying appliances behind firewalls, separating mail and management network interfaces, disabling unnecessary network services (http, ftp), using ssl/tls with trusted certificates and .

Data Exfiltration: True

Ransom Demanded: $1.5M+ (confirmed from two victims)
Ransom Paid: $1.5M+ (confirmed)
Ransomware Strain: Yanluowang
Data Encryption: True
Data Exfiltration: ['Double Extortion (likely)']

Ransom Demanded: $300,000 to $15,000,000 (per victim)
Ransom Paid: $1,500,000 (total from two victims)
Ransomware Strain: Yanluowang
Data Encryption: True
Data Exfiltration: True
Data Recovery from Ransomware: The company recovers data encrypted by ransomware through Monitoring web logs and sending logs to external servers, Reviewing deployment guides for security best practices, .

Regulatory Notifications: U.K. NCSC advisory (2025-09-25)Canadian Centre for Cyber Security advisory

Regulatory Notifications: Emergency Directives (e.g., U.S. CISA)Public Advisories (CSE, NCSC)

Regulatory Notifications: CISA directives to federal agencies

Regulations Violated: CISA Emergency Directive (Non-Compliance Risk for Federal Agencies),
Regulatory Notifications: CISA Mandate for Federal AgenciesNCSC (UK) Advisory

Legal Actions: U.S. Federal Charges (hacking, theft, extortion), Plea Deal (2025-10-29), Extradition from Italy (2023),

Legal Actions: arrest (Italy, January 2024), extradition to U.S., guilty plea (October 29, 2024), charges: unlawful transfer of means of identification, trafficking in access information, access device fraud, aggravated identity theft, conspiracy to commit computer fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering,
Ensuring Regulatory Compliance: The company ensures compliance with regulatory requirements through U.S. Federal Charges (hacking, theft, extortion), Plea Deal (2025-10-29), Extradition from Italy (2023), , arrest (Italy, January 2024), extradition to U.S., guilty plea (October 29, 2024), charges: unlawful transfer of means of identification, trafficking in access information, access device fraud, aggravated identity theft, conspiracy to commit computer fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, .

Lessons Learned: The critical importance of maintaining updated systems and monitoring access control within corporate environments to prevent data breaches and maintain operational integrity.

Lessons Learned: Proactive internal security testing can uncover critical vulnerabilities before exploitation (discovered by Brandon Sakai of Cisco)., Vulnerabilities in authentication systems (e.g., RADIUS) can have severe impacts if input validation is insufficient., Lack of workarounds for critical flaws underscores the importance of patch management and alternative mitigation strategies (e.g., disabling vulnerable features).

Lessons Learned: End-of-support (EoS) devices pose significant risks even if functional, Advanced threat actors leverage multi-stage malware (bootkits + shellcode loaders) to evade detection, Persistence mechanisms (e.g., ROMMON modifications) can survive reboots/upgrades on legacy hardware, VPN web services are a high-value target for APT groups, Secure Boot/Trust Anchor technologies are critical for mitigating firmware-level attacks

Lessons Learned: Proactive Patching is Critical for Zero-Day Vulnerabilities, Exposed VPN Interfaces Are High-Risk Targets, Federal Directives Can Accelerate Response in Critical Infrastructure, Threat Intelligence Sharing (e.g., Shadowserver, Greynoise) Provides Early Warnings

Lessons Learned: Initial access brokers play a critical role in ransomware ecosystems, enabling attacks by selling pre-compromised access., Threat actors often masquerade as other nationalities (e.g., Yanluowang posed as Chinese but was Russian)., Cryptocurrency tracing and digital breadcrumbs (e.g., email, Apple ID) are vital for attribution., Collaboration between cybersecurity firms (Symantec, Kaspersky) and law enforcement (FBI) can disrupt ransomware operations., Leaked internal chats can expose operational details and debunk threat actor personas.

Lessons Learned: Misconfigured ports and exposed services can lead to full system compromise. Organizations must restrict access, monitor logs, and follow security best practices to mitigate risks.

Recommendations: Apply the patches as directed in the vendor's bulletin.

Recommendations: Immediately patch affected Cisco Secure FMC Software (versions 7.0.7, 7.7.0) to the latest release., Disable RADIUS authentication if patching is not immediately feasible, and switch to LDAP, SAML SSO, or local accounts., Prioritize this vulnerability as a 'priority-one' patching scenario due to its critical severity (CVSS 10.0) and potential for unauthenticated remote code execution., Conduct a review of all authentication mechanisms in enterprise firewall infrastructure to identify similar input validation risks., Monitor for unusual authentication attempts or command execution on FMC systems until patches are applied.Immediately patch affected Cisco Secure FMC Software (versions 7.0.7, 7.7.0) to the latest release., Disable RADIUS authentication if patching is not immediately feasible, and switch to LDAP, SAML SSO, or local accounts., Prioritize this vulnerability as a 'priority-one' patching scenario due to its critical severity (CVSS 10.0) and potential for unauthenticated remote code execution., Conduct a review of all authentication mechanisms in enterprise firewall infrastructure to identify similar input validation risks., Monitor for unusual authentication attempts or command execution on FMC systems until patches are applied.Immediately patch affected Cisco Secure FMC Software (versions 7.0.7, 7.7.0) to the latest release., Disable RADIUS authentication if patching is not immediately feasible, and switch to LDAP, SAML SSO, or local accounts., Prioritize this vulnerability as a 'priority-one' patching scenario due to its critical severity (CVSS 10.0) and potential for unauthenticated remote code execution., Conduct a review of all authentication mechanisms in enterprise firewall infrastructure to identify similar input validation risks., Monitor for unusual authentication attempts or command execution on FMC systems until patches are applied.Immediately patch affected Cisco Secure FMC Software (versions 7.0.7, 7.7.0) to the latest release., Disable RADIUS authentication if patching is not immediately feasible, and switch to LDAP, SAML SSO, or local accounts., Prioritize this vulnerability as a 'priority-one' patching scenario due to its critical severity (CVSS 10.0) and potential for unauthenticated remote code execution., Conduct a review of all authentication mechanisms in enterprise firewall infrastructure to identify similar input validation risks., Monitor for unusual authentication attempts or command execution on FMC systems until patches are applied.Immediately patch affected Cisco Secure FMC Software (versions 7.0.7, 7.7.0) to the latest release., Disable RADIUS authentication if patching is not immediately feasible, and switch to LDAP, SAML SSO, or local accounts., Prioritize this vulnerability as a 'priority-one' patching scenario due to its critical severity (CVSS 10.0) and potential for unauthenticated remote code execution., Conduct a review of all authentication mechanisms in enterprise firewall infrastructure to identify similar input validation risks., Monitor for unusual authentication attempts or command execution on FMC systems until patches are applied.

Recommendations: Immediately patch CVE-2025-20362, CVE-2025-20333, and CVE-2025-20363, Replace end-of-support Cisco ASA 5500-X Series devices, Enable Secure Boot and Trust Anchor on supported devices, Disable VPN web services if not essential, Monitor for unusual CLI command activity or syslog suppression, Deploy network segmentation to limit lateral movement, Conduct forensic analysis of ASA firmware for signs of RayInitiator/LINE VIPER, Implement behavioral detection for ICMP/TCP and WebVPN C2 trafficImmediately patch CVE-2025-20362, CVE-2025-20333, and CVE-2025-20363, Replace end-of-support Cisco ASA 5500-X Series devices, Enable Secure Boot and Trust Anchor on supported devices, Disable VPN web services if not essential, Monitor for unusual CLI command activity or syslog suppression, Deploy network segmentation to limit lateral movement, Conduct forensic analysis of ASA firmware for signs of RayInitiator/LINE VIPER, Implement behavioral detection for ICMP/TCP and WebVPN C2 trafficImmediately patch CVE-2025-20362, CVE-2025-20333, and CVE-2025-20363, Replace end-of-support Cisco ASA 5500-X Series devices, Enable Secure Boot and Trust Anchor on supported devices, Disable VPN web services if not essential, Monitor for unusual CLI command activity or syslog suppression, Deploy network segmentation to limit lateral movement, Conduct forensic analysis of ASA firmware for signs of RayInitiator/LINE VIPER, Implement behavioral detection for ICMP/TCP and WebVPN C2 trafficImmediately patch CVE-2025-20362, CVE-2025-20333, and CVE-2025-20363, Replace end-of-support Cisco ASA 5500-X Series devices, Enable Secure Boot and Trust Anchor on supported devices, Disable VPN web services if not essential, Monitor for unusual CLI command activity or syslog suppression, Deploy network segmentation to limit lateral movement, Conduct forensic analysis of ASA firmware for signs of RayInitiator/LINE VIPER, Implement behavioral detection for ICMP/TCP and WebVPN C2 trafficImmediately patch CVE-2025-20362, CVE-2025-20333, and CVE-2025-20363, Replace end-of-support Cisco ASA 5500-X Series devices, Enable Secure Boot and Trust Anchor on supported devices, Disable VPN web services if not essential, Monitor for unusual CLI command activity or syslog suppression, Deploy network segmentation to limit lateral movement, Conduct forensic analysis of ASA firmware for signs of RayInitiator/LINE VIPER, Implement behavioral detection for ICMP/TCP and WebVPN C2 trafficImmediately patch CVE-2025-20362, CVE-2025-20333, and CVE-2025-20363, Replace end-of-support Cisco ASA 5500-X Series devices, Enable Secure Boot and Trust Anchor on supported devices, Disable VPN web services if not essential, Monitor for unusual CLI command activity or syslog suppression, Deploy network segmentation to limit lateral movement, Conduct forensic analysis of ASA firmware for signs of RayInitiator/LINE VIPER, Implement behavioral detection for ICMP/TCP and WebVPN C2 trafficImmediately patch CVE-2025-20362, CVE-2025-20333, and CVE-2025-20363, Replace end-of-support Cisco ASA 5500-X Series devices, Enable Secure Boot and Trust Anchor on supported devices, Disable VPN web services if not essential, Monitor for unusual CLI command activity or syslog suppression, Deploy network segmentation to limit lateral movement, Conduct forensic analysis of ASA firmware for signs of RayInitiator/LINE VIPER, Implement behavioral detection for ICMP/TCP and WebVPN C2 trafficImmediately patch CVE-2025-20362, CVE-2025-20333, and CVE-2025-20363, Replace end-of-support Cisco ASA 5500-X Series devices, Enable Secure Boot and Trust Anchor on supported devices, Disable VPN web services if not essential, Monitor for unusual CLI command activity or syslog suppression, Deploy network segmentation to limit lateral movement, Conduct forensic analysis of ASA firmware for signs of RayInitiator/LINE VIPER, Implement behavioral detection for ICMP/TCP and WebVPN C2 traffic

Recommendations: Immediate patching of Cisco ASA vulnerabilities as per vendor and cyber agency guidelines., Enhanced monitoring for signs of compromise, especially in legacy systems., Collaboration with cybersecurity agencies (e.g., CSE, CISA, NCSC) for threat intelligence sharing., Review and update incident response plans for state-sponsored APTs., Prioritize security updates for VPN and remote access infrastructure.Immediate patching of Cisco ASA vulnerabilities as per vendor and cyber agency guidelines., Enhanced monitoring for signs of compromise, especially in legacy systems., Collaboration with cybersecurity agencies (e.g., CSE, CISA, NCSC) for threat intelligence sharing., Review and update incident response plans for state-sponsored APTs., Prioritize security updates for VPN and remote access infrastructure.Immediate patching of Cisco ASA vulnerabilities as per vendor and cyber agency guidelines., Enhanced monitoring for signs of compromise, especially in legacy systems., Collaboration with cybersecurity agencies (e.g., CSE, CISA, NCSC) for threat intelligence sharing., Review and update incident response plans for state-sponsored APTs., Prioritize security updates for VPN and remote access infrastructure.Immediate patching of Cisco ASA vulnerabilities as per vendor and cyber agency guidelines., Enhanced monitoring for signs of compromise, especially in legacy systems., Collaboration with cybersecurity agencies (e.g., CSE, CISA, NCSC) for threat intelligence sharing., Review and update incident response plans for state-sponsored APTs., Prioritize security updates for VPN and remote access infrastructure.Immediate patching of Cisco ASA vulnerabilities as per vendor and cyber agency guidelines., Enhanced monitoring for signs of compromise, especially in legacy systems., Collaboration with cybersecurity agencies (e.g., CSE, CISA, NCSC) for threat intelligence sharing., Review and update incident response plans for state-sponsored APTs., Prioritize security updates for VPN and remote access infrastructure.

Recommendations: Immediately Patch CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20362 on All Cisco ASA/FTD Devices, Restrict Public Exposure of VPN Web Interfaces, Deploy Enhanced Monitoring for Suspicious HTTP Requests and VPN Logins, Disconnect End-of-Support (EoS) Devices from Networks, Follow CISA and NCSC Guidelines for Hardening Network Perimeters, Conduct Threat Hunting for 'Line Viper' and 'RayInitiator' MalwareImmediately Patch CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20362 on All Cisco ASA/FTD Devices, Restrict Public Exposure of VPN Web Interfaces, Deploy Enhanced Monitoring for Suspicious HTTP Requests and VPN Logins, Disconnect End-of-Support (EoS) Devices from Networks, Follow CISA and NCSC Guidelines for Hardening Network Perimeters, Conduct Threat Hunting for 'Line Viper' and 'RayInitiator' MalwareImmediately Patch CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20362 on All Cisco ASA/FTD Devices, Restrict Public Exposure of VPN Web Interfaces, Deploy Enhanced Monitoring for Suspicious HTTP Requests and VPN Logins, Disconnect End-of-Support (EoS) Devices from Networks, Follow CISA and NCSC Guidelines for Hardening Network Perimeters, Conduct Threat Hunting for 'Line Viper' and 'RayInitiator' MalwareImmediately Patch CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20362 on All Cisco ASA/FTD Devices, Restrict Public Exposure of VPN Web Interfaces, Deploy Enhanced Monitoring for Suspicious HTTP Requests and VPN Logins, Disconnect End-of-Support (EoS) Devices from Networks, Follow CISA and NCSC Guidelines for Hardening Network Perimeters, Conduct Threat Hunting for 'Line Viper' and 'RayInitiator' MalwareImmediately Patch CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20362 on All Cisco ASA/FTD Devices, Restrict Public Exposure of VPN Web Interfaces, Deploy Enhanced Monitoring for Suspicious HTTP Requests and VPN Logins, Disconnect End-of-Support (EoS) Devices from Networks, Follow CISA and NCSC Guidelines for Hardening Network Perimeters, Conduct Threat Hunting for 'Line Viper' and 'RayInitiator' MalwareImmediately Patch CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20362 on All Cisco ASA/FTD Devices, Restrict Public Exposure of VPN Web Interfaces, Deploy Enhanced Monitoring for Suspicious HTTP Requests and VPN Logins, Disconnect End-of-Support (EoS) Devices from Networks, Follow CISA and NCSC Guidelines for Hardening Network Perimeters, Conduct Threat Hunting for 'Line Viper' and 'RayInitiator' Malware

Recommendations: Monitor dark web forums for initial access brokerage activity targeting your industry., Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) and least-privilege access to thwart initial access brokers., Regularly audit cryptocurrency transactions for signs of ransomware payments., Prepare for double-extortion tactics (data encryption + exfiltration) in ransomware response plans., Leverage threat intelligence sharing to identify emerging ransomware strains like Yanluowang.Monitor dark web forums for initial access brokerage activity targeting your industry., Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) and least-privilege access to thwart initial access brokers., Regularly audit cryptocurrency transactions for signs of ransomware payments., Prepare for double-extortion tactics (data encryption + exfiltration) in ransomware response plans., Leverage threat intelligence sharing to identify emerging ransomware strains like Yanluowang.Monitor dark web forums for initial access brokerage activity targeting your industry., Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) and least-privilege access to thwart initial access brokers., Regularly audit cryptocurrency transactions for signs of ransomware payments., Prepare for double-extortion tactics (data encryption + exfiltration) in ransomware response plans., Leverage threat intelligence sharing to identify emerging ransomware strains like Yanluowang.Monitor dark web forums for initial access brokerage activity targeting your industry., Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) and least-privilege access to thwart initial access brokers., Regularly audit cryptocurrency transactions for signs of ransomware payments., Prepare for double-extortion tactics (data encryption + exfiltration) in ransomware response plans., Leverage threat intelligence sharing to identify emerging ransomware strains like Yanluowang.Monitor dark web forums for initial access brokerage activity targeting your industry., Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) and least-privilege access to thwart initial access brokers., Regularly audit cryptocurrency transactions for signs of ransomware payments., Prepare for double-extortion tactics (data encryption + exfiltration) in ransomware response plans., Leverage threat intelligence sharing to identify emerging ransomware strains like Yanluowang.

Recommendations: Immediately assess exposure and restrict access to appliances, Consult Cisco TAC for potential compromises, Continuously monitor and patch appliances, Leverage real-time vulnerability intelligence to detect zero-day exploits, Follow Cisco’s security hardening recommendationsImmediately assess exposure and restrict access to appliances, Consult Cisco TAC for potential compromises, Continuously monitor and patch appliances, Leverage real-time vulnerability intelligence to detect zero-day exploits, Follow Cisco’s security hardening recommendationsImmediately assess exposure and restrict access to appliances, Consult Cisco TAC for potential compromises, Continuously monitor and patch appliances, Leverage real-time vulnerability intelligence to detect zero-day exploits, Follow Cisco’s security hardening recommendationsImmediately assess exposure and restrict access to appliances, Consult Cisco TAC for potential compromises, Continuously monitor and patch appliances, Leverage real-time vulnerability intelligence to detect zero-day exploits, Follow Cisco’s security hardening recommendationsImmediately assess exposure and restrict access to appliances, Consult Cisco TAC for potential compromises, Continuously monitor and patch appliances, Leverage real-time vulnerability intelligence to detect zero-day exploits, Follow Cisco’s security hardening recommendations
Key Lessons Learned: The key lessons learned from past incidents are The critical importance of maintaining updated systems and monitoring access control within corporate environments to prevent data breaches and maintain operational integrity.Proactive internal security testing can uncover critical vulnerabilities before exploitation (discovered by Brandon Sakai of Cisco).,Vulnerabilities in authentication systems (e.g., RADIUS) can have severe impacts if input validation is insufficient.,Lack of workarounds for critical flaws underscores the importance of patch management and alternative mitigation strategies (e.g., disabling vulnerable features).End-of-support (EoS) devices pose significant risks even if functional,Advanced threat actors leverage multi-stage malware (bootkits + shellcode loaders) to evade detection,Persistence mechanisms (e.g., ROMMON modifications) can survive reboots/upgrades on legacy hardware,VPN web services are a high-value target for APT groups,Secure Boot/Trust Anchor technologies are critical for mitigating firmware-level attacksProactive Patching is Critical for Zero-Day Vulnerabilities,Exposed VPN Interfaces Are High-Risk Targets,Federal Directives Can Accelerate Response in Critical Infrastructure,Threat Intelligence Sharing (e.g., Shadowserver, Greynoise) Provides Early WarningsInitial access brokers play a critical role in ransomware ecosystems, enabling attacks by selling pre-compromised access.,Threat actors often masquerade as other nationalities (e.g., Yanluowang posed as Chinese but was Russian).,Cryptocurrency tracing and digital breadcrumbs (e.g., email, Apple ID) are vital for attribution.,Collaboration between cybersecurity firms (Symantec, Kaspersky) and law enforcement (FBI) can disrupt ransomware operations.,Leaked internal chats can expose operational details and debunk threat actor personas.Misconfigured ports and exposed services can lead to full system compromise. Organizations must restrict access, monitor logs, and follow security best practices to mitigate risks.
Implemented Recommendations: The company has implemented the following recommendations to improve cybersecurity: Continuously monitor and patch appliances, Follow Cisco’s security hardening recommendations, Prioritize security updates for VPN and remote access infrastructure., Immediate patching of Cisco ASA vulnerabilities as per vendor and cyber agency guidelines., Consult Cisco TAC for potential compromises, Enhanced monitoring for signs of compromise, especially in legacy systems., Apply the patches as directed in the vendor's bulletin., Leverage real-time vulnerability intelligence to detect zero-day exploits, Collaboration with cybersecurity agencies (e.g., CSE, CISA, NCSC) for threat intelligence sharing., Immediately assess exposure and restrict access to appliances and Review and update incident response plans for state-sponsored APTs..

Source: BleepingComputer

Source: California Office of the Attorney General
Date Accessed: 2016-10-25

Source: zerodayinitiative.com

Source: Cisco Security Advisory: CVE-2025-20265
Date Accessed: August 2025

Source: Cisco August 2025 Semiannual Security Advisory Bundled Publication
URL: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/publicationListing.x
Date Accessed: August 2025

Source: U.K. National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)
Date Accessed: 2025-09-25

Source: Cisco Security Advisory
Date Accessed: 2025-09

Source: Canadian Centre for Cyber Security Advisory
Date Accessed: 2025-09

Source: CBC News
URL: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cisco-cyberattack-cse-warning-1.7240000
Date Accessed: 2024-06-20

Source: U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Emergency Directive
URL: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives
Date Accessed: 2024-06-20

Source: Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CSE) Advisory
URL: https://cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance
Date Accessed: 2024-06-20

Source: UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) Warning
URL: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news
Date Accessed: 2024-06-20

Source: Cisco Security Advisory (ArcaneDoor)
Date Accessed: 2024-06-20

Source: Wired

Source: CISA Directive (September 25, 2025)
Date Accessed: 2025-09-25

Source: Cisco Security Advisory (CVE-2025-20333)
URL: [1]
Date Accessed: 2024-09-25

Source: Cisco Security Advisory (CVE-2025-20362)
URL: [2]
Date Accessed: 2024-09-25

Source: The Shadowserver Foundation - Vulnerable Cisco ASA/FTD Scan Report
Date Accessed: 2024-09-29

Source: CISA Emergency Directive on Cisco ASA/FTD Vulnerabilities
Date Accessed: 2024-09-25

Source: UK NCSC Threat Report on Line Viper and RayInitiator Malware
Date Accessed: 2024-09-29

Source: Greynoise - Early Warning on Cisco ASA Scans
Date Accessed: 2024-09-04

Source: U.S. Department of Justice (Court Documents)
Date Accessed: 2025-10-29

Source: Seamus Hughes (Reporter, Unsealed Documents)

Source: Symantec (Yanluowang Discovery, 2021)
Date Accessed: 2021-10

Source: Kaspersky (Decrypter Release, 2022)
Date Accessed: 2022

Source: FBI Investigation (Cryptocurrency Tracing)

Source: Court Watch (Seamus Hughes)

Source: FBI affidavit (Special Agent Jeffrey Hunter)

Source: Blockchain analysis (ransom payments)

Source: Cisco Talos Blog Post

Source: Cyble
Additional Resources: Stakeholders can find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices at and Source: BleepingComputer, and Source: California Office of the Attorney GeneralDate Accessed: 2016-10-25, and Source: zerodayinitiative.comUrl: https://www.zerodayinitiative.com, and Source: Cisco Security Advisory: CVE-2025-20265Url: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-fmc-rce-KLJ98X7QDate Accessed: August 2025, and Source: Cisco August 2025 Semiannual Security Advisory Bundled PublicationUrl: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/publicationListing.xDate Accessed: August 2025, and Source: U.K. National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)Date Accessed: 2025-09-25, and Source: Cisco Security AdvisoryDate Accessed: 2025-09, and Source: Canadian Centre for Cyber Security AdvisoryDate Accessed: 2025-09, and Source: CBC NewsUrl: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cisco-cyberattack-cse-warning-1.7240000Date Accessed: 2024-06-20, and Source: U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Emergency DirectiveUrl: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directivesDate Accessed: 2024-06-20, and Source: Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CSE) AdvisoryUrl: https://cyber.gc.ca/en/guidanceDate Accessed: 2024-06-20, and Source: UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) WarningUrl: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/newsDate Accessed: 2024-06-20, and Source: Cisco Security Advisory (ArcaneDoor)Url: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asa-arcane-door-2024Date Accessed: 2024-06-20, and Source: BloombergDate Accessed: 2025-09-28, and Source: Wired, and Source: CISA Directive (September 25, 2025)Date Accessed: 2025-09-25, and Source: Cisco Security Advisory (CVE-2025-20333)Url: [1]Date Accessed: 2024-09-25, and Source: Cisco Security Advisory (CVE-2025-20362)Url: [2]Date Accessed: 2024-09-25, and Source: The Shadowserver Foundation - Vulnerable Cisco ASA/FTD Scan ReportDate Accessed: 2024-09-29, and Source: CISA Emergency Directive on Cisco ASA/FTD VulnerabilitiesDate Accessed: 2024-09-25, and Source: UK NCSC Threat Report on Line Viper and RayInitiator MalwareDate Accessed: 2024-09-29, and Source: Greynoise - Early Warning on Cisco ASA ScansDate Accessed: 2024-09-04, and Source: U.S. Department of Justice (Court Documents)Date Accessed: 2025-10-29, and Source: Seamus Hughes (Reporter, Unsealed Documents), and Source: Symantec (Yanluowang Discovery, 2021)Date Accessed: 2021-10, and Source: Kaspersky (Decrypter Release, 2022)Date Accessed: 2022, and Source: FBI Investigation (Cryptocurrency Tracing), and Source: Court Watch (Seamus Hughes), and Source: FBI affidavit (Special Agent Jeffrey Hunter), and Source: Blockchain analysis (ransom payments), and Source: Cisco AdvisoryUrl: cisco-sa-sma-attack-N9bf4, and Source: Cisco Talos Blog Post, and Source: Cyble.

Investigation Status: Disclosed; No public exploitation reported. Internal discovery by Cisco.

Investigation Status: Ongoing (as of 2025-09-25)

Investigation Status: Ongoing (CSE and international allies investigating scope and attribution)

Investigation Status: Ongoing (CISA and Cisco involved)

Investigation Status: Ongoing (Active Exploitation Confirmed; Patching Underway)

Investigation Status: Ongoing (Plea deal signed 2025-11-25; sentencing pending)

Investigation Status: ongoing (legal proceedings active, defendant pleaded guilty)

Investigation Status: Ongoing
Communication of Investigation Status: The company communicates the status of incident investigations to stakeholders through Public Advisory Via Cisco’S August 2025 Semiannual Security Advisory Bundled Publication, Urgent Recommendation For Immediate Patching, Public Advisories By Ncsc (2025-09-25), Cisco Security Bulletins, Canadian Centre For Cyber Security Alerts, Public Warnings By Cse (Canada), Cisa (U.S.), Ncsc (Uk), Media Statements (E.G., Cbc News), Collaboration With Five Eyes Alliance, Public Disclosure Via Bloomberg, Cisa Advisories, Cisco Security Advisories [1, 2], Cisa Emergency Directive and Ncsc Threat Report.

Stakeholder Advisories: Urgent Patching Recommended For All Affected Organizations..
Customer Advisories: Customers using Cisco Secure FMC with RADIUS enabled should apply updates or disable RADIUS immediately.

Stakeholder Advisories: Urgent Patching Recommended For All Affected Organizations, Government Agencies Advised To Audit Asa Devices.
Customer Advisories: Cisco PSIRT notificationsPublic security bulletins

Stakeholder Advisories: Urgent Patching Directives For Federal Agencies (U.S.), Public Warnings For Critical Infrastructure Sectors (Canada, Uk, Five Eyes).
Customer Advisories: Cisco customer notifications (via security advisory)Guidance for organizations using Cisco ASA for VPNs

Stakeholder Advisories: Cisa Directives To Federal Agencies, Public Statements By Chris Butera (Cisa).

Stakeholder Advisories: Cisco Customers, Federal Civilian Executive Branch (Fceb) Agencies, Global Organizations Using Cisco Asa/Ftd.
Customer Advisories: Apply Patches ImmediatelyMonitor for Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)Review VPN Access Logs for Unauthorized Activity
Advisories Provided: The company provides the following advisories to stakeholders and customers following an incident: were Urgent Patching Recommended For All Affected Organizations., Customers Using Cisco Secure Fmc With Radius Enabled Should Apply Updates Or Disable Radius Immediately., , Urgent Patching Recommended For All Affected Organizations, Government Agencies Advised To Audit Asa Devices, Cisco Psirt Notifications, Public Security Bulletins, , Urgent Patching Directives For Federal Agencies (U.S.), Public Warnings For Critical Infrastructure Sectors (Canada, Uk, Five Eyes), Cisco Customer Notifications (Via Security Advisory), Guidance For Organizations Using Cisco Asa For Vpns, , Cisa Directives To Federal Agencies, Public Statements By Chris Butera (Cisa), Cisco Customers, Federal Civilian Executive Branch (Fceb) Agencies, Global Organizations Using Cisco Asa/Ftd, Apply Patches Immediately, Monitor For Indicators Of Compromise (Iocs), Review Vpn Access Logs For Unauthorized Activity and .

Entry Point: Cisco switches
Backdoors Established: VELVETSHELL malware

Entry Point: Smart Install Feature
High Value Targets: Telecommunications Providers
Data Sold on Dark Web: Telecommunications Providers

Entry Point: Cve-2025-20362 And Cve-2025-20333 In Cisco Asa Vpn Web Services,
Backdoors Established: ['RayInitiator (GRUB bootkit)', 'LINE VIPER (shellcode loader)', 'ROMMON modifications']
High Value Targets: Government Agencies, Vpn Authentication Systems, Cli Command History,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Government Agencies, Vpn Authentication Systems, Cli Command History,

Entry Point: Vulnerabilities In Cisco Asa Devices (Legacy Systems Targeted),
Backdoors Established: Likely (malware implantation and command execution capabilities)
High Value Targets: Critical Infrastructure Sectors, Government, Academia, And Research Facilities,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Critical Infrastructure Sectors, Government, Academia, And Research Facilities,

Entry Point: Cisco Asa/Ftd Vulnerabilities (Cve-2024-20353, Cve-2024-20359),
Reconnaissance Period: Since 2024 (ArcaneDoor group activity)
High Value Targets: U.S. Federal Cyber Infrastructure, Classified Government Documents,
Data Sold on Dark Web: U.S. Federal Cyber Infrastructure, Classified Government Documents,

Entry Point: Exposed Vpn Web Interfaces, Crafted Http Requests Targeting Cve-2025-20333/Cve-2025-20362,
Reconnaissance Period: Late August 2024 (Greynoise Scans)
Backdoors Established: ['Line Viper (Shellcode Loader)', 'RayInitiator (GRUB Bootkit)']
High Value Targets: Federal Agencies (Fceb), Critical Infrastructure, Enterprises With Sensitive Data,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Federal Agencies (Fceb), Critical Infrastructure, Enterprises With Sensitive Data,

Entry Point: Exploited Vulnerabilities (Unspecified), Potential Phishing,
Reconnaissance Period: July 2021 – November 2022
Backdoors Established: True
High Value Targets: Banks, Telecoms, Engineering Firms, Cisco, Walmart,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Banks, Telecoms, Engineering Firms, Cisco, Walmart,

Entry Point: Corporate Network Breaches (Method Unspecified),
Backdoors Established: True
High Value Targets: U.S. Companies (8+), Cisco (Attempted),
Data Sold on Dark Web: U.S. Companies (8+), Cisco (Attempted),

Entry Point: Exposed Spam Quarantine feature and ports
Backdoors Established: Persistence mechanisms implanted

Root Causes: Erroneous Security Configuration

Root Causes: Zero-day vulnerability CVE-2024-20399

Root Causes: Remote Code Execution (Rce) Through Malicious File Uploads, Unauthorized Disclosure Of Sensitive Information Through Privilege Escalation,
Corrective Actions: Patches And Updates Provided To Users,

Root Causes: Unpatched Systems

Root Causes: Unsafe deserialization and command injection in the enableStrongSwanTunnel() method.
Corrective Actions: Update to 3.3 Patch 7 and 3.4 Patch 2

Root Causes: Insufficient Input Validation In Radius Authentication Subsystem., Improper Handling Of User-Supplied Credentials During Authentication.,
Corrective Actions: Released Patched Software Versions., Recommended Disabling Radius Authentication As A Temporary Mitigation.,

Root Causes: Exploitation Of Unpatched Zero-Day Vulnerabilities In Legacy Devices, Lack Of Secure Boot/Trust Anchor On Asa 5500-X Series, Use Of End-Of-Support Hardware In Critical Infrastructure, Insufficient Logging/Monitoring For Advanced Evasion Techniques,
Corrective Actions: Accelerated Eos Timelines For Vulnerable Devices, Enhanced Firmware Integrity Checks In Asa Software, Improved Detection For Bootkit-Level Persistence, Collaboration With Ncsc/Cccs For Threat Intelligence Sharing,

Root Causes: Exploitation Of Unpatched Vulnerabilities In Cisco Asa, Targeting Of Legacy Systems, State-Sponsored Actor Sophistication,

Root Causes: Unpatched Zero-Day Vulnerabilities In Cisco Devices, Insufficient Monitoring Of High-Value Targets,
Corrective Actions: Mandatory Vulnerability Assessments (Cisa Directive), Patch Management Enforcement,

Root Causes: Delayed Patching Of Zero-Day Vulnerabilities, Over-Exposure Of Vpn Interfaces To The Public Internet, Lack Of Temporary Mitigations (No Workarounds Available), Insufficient Monitoring For Early Indicators Of Exploitation,
Corrective Actions: Mandatory Patching Enforcement (E.G., Cisa Directive), Network Segmentation For Vpn Access Points, Enhanced Threat Detection For Malware (Line Viper, Rayinitiator), Accelerated End-Of-Support (Eos) Device Replacement,

Root Causes: Insufficient Network Segmentation Allowing Lateral Movement Post-Initial Access., Lack Of Detection For Initial Access Brokerage Activity., Vulnerabilities In Yanluowang’S Encryption Algorithm (Later Exploited By Kaspersky For Decrypter)., Use Of Cryptocurrency For Ransom Payments Enabling Anonymity.,
Corrective Actions: Fbi Disruption Of Yanluowang Operations Via Arrest/Extradition Of Volkov., Kaspersky’S Public Release Of A Free Decrypter (2022)., Heightened Scrutiny Of Russian-Linked Threat Actors Masquerading As Other Nationalities., Emphasis On Tracing Cryptocurrency Transactions For Attribution.,

Root Causes: Initial Access Brokerage Enabling Ransomware Deployment, Credential Theft/Exploitation, Potential Vulnerabilities In Corporate Networks,

Root Causes: Misconfigured Spam Quarantine feature and exposed ports
Corrective Actions: Restrict Appliance Access To Trusted Hosts, Upgrade To The Latest Software, Rebuild Compromised Appliances, Implement Strong Authentication Methods,
Post-Incident Analysis Process: The company's process for conducting post-incident analysis is described as U.K. National Cyber Security Centre (Ncsc), Canadian Centre For Cyber Security, , Recommended For Asa/Ftd Devices, , Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance, Cisco Internal Teams, , Recommended (implied by urgency of patching and detection evasion concerns), Cisco Cybersecurity Experts, , Use Of Cisa Cybersecurity Tools For Threat Assessment, , The Shadowserver Foundation (Threat Monitoring), Greynoise (Early Warning Scans), , Monitor For Crafted Http Requests, Track Suspicious Vpn Logins, , Fbi Investigation, Symantec (Threat Intelligence), Kaspersky (Decryption Tool), , Fbi, International Law Enforcement (Italy), , Sending logs to external servers for post-event analysis.
Corrective Actions Taken: The company has taken the following corrective actions based on post-incident analysis: Patches And Updates Provided To Users, , Update to 3.3 Patch 7 and 3.4 Patch 2, Released Patched Software Versions., Recommended Disabling Radius Authentication As A Temporary Mitigation., , Accelerated Eos Timelines For Vulnerable Devices, Enhanced Firmware Integrity Checks In Asa Software, Improved Detection For Bootkit-Level Persistence, Collaboration With Ncsc/Cccs For Threat Intelligence Sharing, , Mandatory Vulnerability Assessments (Cisa Directive), Patch Management Enforcement, , Mandatory Patching Enforcement (E.G., Cisa Directive), Network Segmentation For Vpn Access Points, Enhanced Threat Detection For Malware (Line Viper, Rayinitiator), Accelerated End-Of-Support (Eos) Device Replacement, , Fbi Disruption Of Yanluowang Operations Via Arrest/Extradition Of Volkov., Kaspersky’S Public Release Of A Free Decrypter (2022)., Heightened Scrutiny Of Russian-Linked Threat Actors Masquerading As Other Nationalities., Emphasis On Tracing Cryptocurrency Transactions For Attribution., , Restrict Appliance Access To Trusted Hosts, Upgrade To The Latest Software, Rebuild Compromised Appliances, Implement Strong Authentication Methods, .
Ransom Payment History: The company has Paid ransoms in the past.
Last Ransom Demanded: The amount of the last ransom demanded was $1.5M+ (confirmed from two victims).
Last Attacking Group: The attacking group in the last incident were an Yanluowang ransomware gang, Yanluowang Ransomware Gang, Sudhish Kasaba Ramesh, Velvet Ant, Salt Typhoon, ArcaneDoorUAT4356Storm-1849Suspected China-linked state-sponsored group, State-sponsored actor (high confidence; linked to ArcaneDoor campaign), ArcaneDoor Hacker GroupRussian Hackers (for federal courts breach), Name: Aleksey Olegovich Volkov (aka 'chubaka.kor')Affiliation: ['Yanluowang Ransomware Gang', 'LockBit Ransomware Gang (alleged communication)']Nationality: RussianRole: Initial Access BrokerAliases: ['chubaka.kor', 'Alekseq Olegovi3 Volkov']Birthdate: 2000-03-20Cryptocurrency Wallets: ['Linked to Russian passport-verified account']Email: [email protected] Id: [email protected], Name: Aleksey Olegovich VolkovAliases: ['chubaka.kor', 'nets', '[email protected]', '[email protected]']Affiliation: ['Yanluowang ransomware group', 'potential link to LockBit ransomware gang']Nationality: RussianStatus: arrested (January 2024), extradited to U.S., pleaded guilty (October 29 and 2024).
Most Recent Incident Detected: The most recent incident detected was on 2018-09-24.
Most Recent Incident Publicly Disclosed: The most recent incident publicly disclosed was on 2024-10-29.
Most Recent Incident Resolved: The most recent incident resolved was on 2025-07-22.
Highest Financial Loss: The highest financial loss from an incident was $2,400,000.
Most Significant Data Compromised: The most significant data compromised in an incident were Cisco products or services, Sensitive customer data, Sensitive employee information, Intellectual property, Supply chain operations, , non-sensitive files, classified documents, technical schematics, source code, , name, password, email address, phone number, security question answers, professional profile, educational background, cover letter, resume content, , Sensitive Data, names, addresses, emails, phone numbers, other sensitive data, , Potential exfiltration from government agencies, VPN credentials (via AAA bypass), CLI commands (harvested), Packet captures, , Classified documents (espionage, fraud, money laundering, foreign agent activities), and .
Most Significant System Affected: The most significant system affected in an incident were Cisco Small Business RV Series routers and 16,000 WebEx Teams accounts456 virtual machines and and and Splunk EnterpriseSplunk Cloud PlatformSplunk Secure Gateway app and and Cisco Professional Careers mobile website and and Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) Software (versions 7.0.7, 7.7.0 with RADIUS enabled) and Cisco ASA 5500-X Series (5512-X, 5515-X, 5525-X, 5545-X, 5555-X, 5585-X)Devices running Cisco ASA Software 9.12 or 9.14 with VPN web services enabled and Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA)VPN-enabled systems used by remote workers and Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA)Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) softwareHundreds of Cisco firewall devicesU.S. federal courts computer systems and and and .
Third-Party Assistance in Most Recent Incident: The third-party assistance involved in the most recent incident was u.k. national cyber security centre (ncsc), canadian centre for cyber security, , five eyes intelligence alliance, cisco internal teams, , cisco cybersecurity experts, , the shadowserver foundation (threat monitoring), greynoise (early warning scans), , fbi investigation, symantec (threat intelligence), kaspersky (decryption tool), , fbi, international law enforcement (italy), .
Containment Measures in Most Recent Incident: The containment measures taken in the most recent incident were Took action to contain and eradicate the bad actors, Apply security updates, Disable RADIUS authentication (switch to LDAP/SAML/local accounts), Cisco patches for CVE-2025-20362, CVE-2025-20333, CVE-2025-20363Urgent advisories for updatesDisabling VPN web services on vulnerable devices, Urgent Patching of Cisco ASA VulnerabilitiesEmergency Directives (e.g., U.S. CISA's midnight deadline for federal agencies), CISA directive to identify affected devicesData collection and threat assessment using CISA tools, Restrict VPN Web Interface ExposureDisconnect End-of-Support (EoS) ASA DevicesIncrease Logging/Monitoring for Suspicious VPN Logins, Restricting appliance access to known, trusted hostsDeploying appliances behind firewallsSeparating mail and management network interfacesDisabling unnecessary network services (HTTP and FTP)Using SSL/TLS with trusted certificates.
Most Sensitive Data Compromised: The most sensitive data compromised in a breach were Cisco products or services, Sensitive customer data, password, source code, name, addresses, Potential exfiltration from government agencies, Supply chain operations, names, phone number, Sensitive employee information, cover letter, other sensitive data, classified documents, technical schematics, professional profile, email address, resume content, security question answers, CLI commands (harvested), Packet captures, educational background, Sensitive Data, phone numbers, Classified documents (espionage, fraud, money laundering, foreign agent activities), emails, VPN credentials (via AAA bypass), non-sensitive files and Intellectual property.
Most Significant Legal Action: The most significant legal action taken for a regulatory violation was U.S. Federal Charges (hacking, theft, extortion), Plea Deal (2025-10-29), Extradition from Italy (2023), , arrest (Italy, January 2024), extradition to U.S., guilty plea (October 29, 2024), charges: unlawful transfer of means of identification, trafficking in access information, access device fraud, aggravated identity theft, conspiracy to commit computer fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, .
Most Significant Lesson Learned: The most significant lesson learned from past incidents was Leaked internal chats can expose operational details and debunk threat actor personas., Misconfigured ports and exposed services can lead to full system compromise. Organizations must restrict access, monitor logs, and follow security best practices to mitigate risks.
Most Significant Recommendation Implemented: The most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity was Deploy Enhanced Monitoring for Suspicious HTTP Requests and VPN Logins, Immediately Patch CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20362 on All Cisco ASA/FTD Devices, Disable RADIUS authentication if patching is not immediately feasible, and switch to LDAP, SAML SSO, or local accounts., Follow Cisco’s security hardening recommendations, Leverage threat intelligence sharing to identify emerging ransomware strains like Yanluowang., Conduct a review of all authentication mechanisms in enterprise firewall infrastructure to identify similar input validation risks., Prioritize this vulnerability as a 'priority-one' patching scenario due to its critical severity (CVSS 10.0) and potential for unauthenticated remote code execution., Enable Secure Boot and Trust Anchor on supported devices, Restrict Public Exposure of VPN Web Interfaces, Consult Cisco TAC for potential compromises, Leverage real-time vulnerability intelligence to detect zero-day exploits, Prepare for double-extortion tactics (data encryption + exfiltration) in ransomware response plans., Disable VPN web services if not essential, Implement behavioral detection for ICMP/TCP and WebVPN C2 traffic, Immediate patching of Cisco ASA vulnerabilities as per vendor and cyber agency guidelines., Regularly audit cryptocurrency transactions for signs of ransomware payments., Deploy network segmentation to limit lateral movement, Conduct forensic analysis of ASA firmware for signs of RayInitiator/LINE VIPER, Monitor for unusual CLI command activity or syslog suppression, Conduct Threat Hunting for 'Line Viper' and 'RayInitiator' Malware, Enhanced monitoring for signs of compromise, especially in legacy systems., Continuously monitor and patch appliances, Follow CISA and NCSC Guidelines for Hardening Network Perimeters, Immediately patch affected Cisco Secure FMC Software (versions 7.0.7, 7.7.0) to the latest release., Monitor for unusual authentication attempts or command execution on FMC systems until patches are applied., Prioritize security updates for VPN and remote access infrastructure., Disconnect End-of-Support (EoS) Devices from Networks, Monitor dark web forums for initial access brokerage activity targeting your industry., Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) and least-privilege access to thwart initial access brokers., Replace end-of-support Cisco ASA 5500-X Series devices, Immediately patch CVE-2025-20362, CVE-2025-20333, and CVE-2025-20363, Immediately assess exposure and restrict access to appliances, Apply the patches as directed in the vendor's bulletin., Collaboration with cybersecurity agencies (e.g., CSE, CISA, NCSC) for threat intelligence sharing. and Review and update incident response plans for state-sponsored APTs..
Most Recent Source: The most recent source of information about an incident are Cisco Security Advisory (CVE-2025-20333), Canadian Centre for Cyber Security Advisory, Wired, Kaspersky (Decrypter Release, 2022), Cisco Security Advisory (ArcaneDoor), Cisco August 2025 Semiannual Security Advisory Bundled Publication, CISA Directive (September 25, 2025), UK NCSC Threat Report on Line Viper and RayInitiator Malware, CISA Emergency Directive on Cisco ASA/FTD Vulnerabilities, Cisco Advisory, BleepingComputer, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CSE) Advisory, Greynoise - Early Warning on Cisco ASA Scans, FBI affidavit (Special Agent Jeffrey Hunter), U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Emergency Directive, Seamus Hughes (Reporter, Unsealed Documents), Court Watch (Seamus Hughes), California Office of the Attorney General, Cisco Security Advisory, Cisco Talos Blog Post, Bloomberg, Cyble, Cisco Security Advisory (CVE-2025-20362), CBC News, Cisco Security Advisory: CVE-2025-20265, U.K. National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) Warning, FBI Investigation (Cryptocurrency Tracing), The Shadowserver Foundation - Vulnerable Cisco ASA/FTD Scan Report, U.S. Department of Justice (Court Documents), zerodayinitiative.com, Blockchain analysis (ransom payments), Symantec (Yanluowang Discovery and 2021).
Most Recent URL for Additional Resources: The most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices is https://www.zerodayinitiative.com, https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-fmc-rce-KLJ98X7Q, https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/publicationListing.x, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cisco-cyberattack-cse-warning-1.7240000, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives, https://cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance, https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news, https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asa-arcane-door-2024, [1], [2], cisco-sa-sma-attack-N9bf4 .
Current Status of Most Recent Investigation: The current status of the most recent investigation is Disclosed; No public exploitation reported. Internal discovery by Cisco..
Most Recent Stakeholder Advisory: The most recent stakeholder advisory issued was Urgent patching recommended for all affected organizations., Urgent patching recommended for all affected organizations, Government agencies advised to audit ASA devices, Urgent patching directives for federal agencies (U.S.), Public warnings for critical infrastructure sectors (Canada, UK, Five Eyes), CISA directives to federal agencies, Public statements by Chris Butera (CISA), Cisco Customers, Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) Agencies, Global Organizations Using Cisco ASA/FTD, .
Most Recent Customer Advisory: The most recent customer advisory issued were an Customers using Cisco Secure FMC with RADIUS enabled should apply updates or disable RADIUS immediately., Cisco PSIRT notificationsPublic security bulletins, Cisco customer notifications (via security advisory)Guidance for organizations using Cisco ASA for VPNs and Apply Patches ImmediatelyMonitor for Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)Review VPN Access Logs for Unauthorized Activity.
Most Recent Entry Point: The most recent entry point used by an initial access broker were an Exposed Spam Quarantine feature and ports, Smart Install Feature, Cisco switches and Amazon Web Services.
Most Recent Reconnaissance Period: The most recent reconnaissance period for an incident was Since 2024 (ArcaneDoor group activity), Late August 2024 (Greynoise Scans), July 2021 – November 2022.
Most Significant Root Cause: The most significant root cause identified in post-incident analysis was Erroneous Security Configuration, Zero-day vulnerability CVE-2024-20399, Remote Code Execution (RCE) through malicious file uploadsUnauthorized disclosure of sensitive information through privilege escalation, Unpatched Systems, Unsafe deserialization and command injection in the enableStrongSwanTunnel() method., Insufficient input validation in RADIUS authentication subsystem.Improper handling of user-supplied credentials during authentication., Exploitation of unpatched zero-day vulnerabilities in legacy devicesLack of Secure Boot/Trust Anchor on ASA 5500-X SeriesUse of end-of-support hardware in critical infrastructureInsufficient logging/monitoring for advanced evasion techniques, Exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities in Cisco ASATargeting of legacy systemsState-sponsored actor sophistication, Unpatched zero-day vulnerabilities in Cisco devicesInsufficient monitoring of high-value targets, Delayed Patching of Zero-Day VulnerabilitiesOver-Exposure of VPN Interfaces to the Public InternetLack of Temporary Mitigations (No Workarounds Available)Insufficient Monitoring for Early Indicators of Exploitation, Insufficient network segmentation allowing lateral movement post-initial access.Lack of detection for initial access brokerage activity.Vulnerabilities in Yanluowang’s encryption algorithm (later exploited by Kaspersky for decrypter).Use of cryptocurrency for ransom payments enabling anonymity., initial access brokerage enabling ransomware deploymentcredential theft/exploitationpotential vulnerabilities in corporate networks, Misconfigured Spam Quarantine feature and exposed ports.
Most Significant Corrective Action: The most significant corrective action taken based on post-incident analysis was Patches and updates provided to users, Update to 3.3 Patch 7 and 3.4 Patch 2, Released patched software versions.Recommended disabling RADIUS authentication as a temporary mitigation., Accelerated EoS timelines for vulnerable devicesEnhanced firmware integrity checks in ASA softwareImproved detection for bootkit-level persistenceCollaboration with NCSC/CCCS for threat intelligence sharing, Mandatory vulnerability assessments (CISA directive)Patch management enforcement, Mandatory Patching Enforcement (e.g., CISA Directive)Network Segmentation for VPN Access PointsEnhanced Threat Detection for Malware (Line Viper, RayInitiator)Accelerated End-of-Support (EoS) Device Replacement, FBI disruption of Yanluowang operations via arrest/extradition of Volkov.Kaspersky’s public release of a free decrypter (2022).Heightened scrutiny of Russian-linked threat actors masquerading as other nationalities.Emphasis on tracing cryptocurrency transactions for attribution., Restrict appliance access to trusted hostsUpgrade to the latest softwareRebuild compromised appliancesImplement strong authentication methods.
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n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. Versions starting with 0.211.0 and prior to 1.120.4, 1.121.1, and 1.122.0 contain a critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in their workflow expression evaluation system. Under certain conditions, expressions supplied by authenticated users during workflow configuration may be evaluated in an execution context that is not sufficiently isolated from the underlying runtime. An authenticated attacker could abuse this behavior to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the n8n process. Successful exploitation may lead to full compromise of the affected instance, including unauthorized access to sensitive data, modification of workflows, and execution of system-level operations. This issue has been fixed in versions 1.120.4, 1.121.1, and 1.122.0. Users are strongly advised to upgrade to a patched version, which introduces additional safeguards to restrict expression evaluation. If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only; and/or deploy n8n in a hardened environment with restricted operating system privileges and network access to reduce the impact of potential exploitation. These workarounds do not fully eliminate the risk and should only be used as short-term measures.
FastAPI Users allows users to quickly add a registration and authentication system to their FastAPI project. Prior to version 15.0.2, the OAuth login state tokens are completely stateless and carry no per-request entropy or any data that could link them to the session that initiated the OAuth flow. `generate_state_token()` is always called with an empty `state_data` dict, so the resulting JWT only contains the fixed audience claim plus an expiration timestamp. On callback, the library merely checks that the JWT verifies under `state_secret` and is unexpired; there is no attempt to match the state value to the browser that initiated the OAuth request, no correlation cookie, and no server-side cache. Any attacker can hit `/authorize`, capture the server-generated state, finish the upstream OAuth flow with their own provider account, and then trick a victim into loading `.../callback?code=<attacker_code>&state=<attacker_state>`. Because the state JWT is valid for any client for \~1 hour, the victim’s browser will complete the flow. This leads to login CSRF. Depending on the app’s logic, the login CSRF can lead to an account takeover of the victim account or to the victim user getting logged in to the attacker's account. Version 15.0.2 contains a patch for the issue.
FileZilla Client 3.63.1 contains a DLL hijacking vulnerability that allows attackers to execute malicious code by placing a crafted TextShaping.dll in the application directory. Attackers can generate a reverse shell payload using msfvenom and replace the missing DLL to achieve remote code execution when the application launches.
LDAP Tool Box Self Service Password 1.5.2 contains a password reset vulnerability that allows attackers to manipulate HTTP Host headers during token generation. Attackers can craft malicious password reset requests that generate tokens sent to a controlled server, enabling potential account takeover by intercepting and using stolen reset tokens.
Kimai 1.30.10 contains a SameSite cookie vulnerability that allows attackers to steal user session cookies through malicious exploitation. Attackers can trick victims into executing a crafted PHP script that captures and writes session cookie information to a file, enabling potential session hijacking.

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