SONIC®, America’s Drive-In®, is part of the Inspire Brands family of restaurants. Inspire is a multi-brand restaurant company whose portfolio includes more than 8,300 Arby’s, Buffalo Wild Wings, and SONIC locations worldwide.
Founded in New Orleans in 1972, POPEYES® has more than 45 years of history and culinary tradition. Popeyes distinguishes itself with a unique New Orleans-style menu featuring spicy chicken, chicken tenders, fried shrimp, and other regional items. The chain's passion for its Louisiana heritage and flavorful authentic food has allowed Popeyes to become one of the world's largest chicken quick-service restaurants with over 3,600 restaurants in the U.S. and around the world.
Security & Compliance Standards Overview
No incidents recorded for SONIC in 2026.
No incidents recorded for Popeyes Louisiana Kitchen in 2026.
SONIC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
Popeyes Louisiana Kitchen cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
Last 3 Security & Risk Events by Company
Improper validation of specified type of input in M365 Copilot allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network.
Improper access control in Azure Front Door (AFD) allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
Azure Entra ID Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Moonraker is a Python web server providing API access to Klipper 3D printing firmware. In versions 0.9.3 and below, instances configured with the "ldap" component enabled are vulnerable to LDAP search filter injection techniques via the login endpoint. The 401 error response message can be used to determine whether or not a search was successful, allowing for brute force methods to discover LDAP entries on the server such as user IDs and user attributes. This issue has been fixed in version 0.10.0.
Runtipi is a Docker-based, personal homeserver orchestrator that facilitates multiple services on a single server. Versions 3.7.0 and above allow an authenticated user to execute arbitrary system commands on the host server by injecting shell metacharacters into backup filenames. The BackupManager fails to sanitize the filenames of uploaded backups. The system persists user-uploaded files directly to the host filesystem using the raw originalname provided in the request. This allows an attacker to stage a file containing shell metacharacters (e.g., $(id).tar.gz) at a predictable path, which is later referenced during the restore process. The successful storage of the file is what allows the subsequent restore command to reference and execute it. This issue has been fixed in version 4.7.0.
