Comparison Overview
Sollio Cooperative Group

Sollio Cooperative Group
9001 Boulevard de l'Acadie, Montréal, H4N 2Y8, CA
Last Update: 19/03/2026
We are the largest agri-food cooperative in Canada, with strong roots in Québec. We are people of the land, forward thinkers with our feet planted in the present, our sights set on the future. Our network serves as lead economic drivers in the agriculture, retail and fo...

Syngenta Group
Rosentalstrasse 67, Basel, 4002, CH
Last Update: 02/06/2026
To help feed 10 billion people while reducing emissions and improve biodiversity. This is our mission as the global agriculture technology leader. With over 56,000 employees in more than 90 countries and hundreds of thousands of agricultural partners worldwide, we are c...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Sollio Cooperative Group







Syngenta Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Farming Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Sollio Cooperative Group in 2026.
Incidents vs Farming Industry Avg (This Year)
Syngenta Group has 2.91% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Sollio Cooperative Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Sollio Cooperative Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Syngenta Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Syngenta Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Sollio Cooperative Group

Syngenta Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.