Comparison Overview
SK hynix memory solutions America Inc.

SK hynix memory solutions America Inc.
3103 North First Street, San Jose, CA, 95134, US
Last Update: 31/03/2026
SK hynix memory solutions America Inc. (SKHMS America) was formed in August 2012 as a result of the acquisition of Link_A_Media Devices Corporation (LAMD) by SK hynix. **About SK hynix** SK hynix will present a valuable future to stakeholders, including customers, ...

MediaTek
No.1, Dusing Rd. 1, Hsin-Chu, 30078, TW
Last Update: 20/09/2026
MediaTek Incorporated (TWSE: 2454) is a global fabless semiconductor company that enables nearly 2 billion connected devices a year. We are a market leader in developing innovative systems-on-chip (SoC) for mobile, home entertainment, connectivity and IoT products. Our ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

SK hynix memory solutions America Inc.







MediaTek






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for SK hynix memory solutions America Inc. in 2026.
Incidents vs Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
MediaTek has 1.96% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - SK hynix memory solutions America Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SK hynix memory solutions America Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - MediaTek (X = Date, Y = Severity)
MediaTek cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

SK hynix memory solutions America Inc.

MediaTek
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.