Comparison Overview
SIS Global, Saudi HQ

SIS Global, Saudi HQ
King Fahad Road, Riyadh , Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, SA, 16511
Last Update: 13/03/2026
Welcome to SIS Global: Uniting Intelligent Solutions with Inspired Services Established in 2007 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, SIS Global is a testament to Saudi ingenuity and entrepreneurial spirit. With a foundation built on the creativity of our people, the efficiency of o...

VXI Global Solutions
515 S Figueroa St, Los Angeles, 90071, US
Last Update: 03/04/2026
About VXI Global Solutions VXI Global Solutions is a BPO leader in customer service, customer experience, and digital solutions. Founded in 1998, the company has 40,000+ employees in 43 locations in North America, Asia, Europe, and the Caribbean. VXI delivers omnich...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

SIS Global, Saudi HQ







VXI Global Solutions






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Outsourcing and Offshoring Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for SIS Global, Saudi HQ in 2026.
Incidents vs Outsourcing and Offshoring Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for VXI Global Solutions in 2026.
Incident History - SIS Global, Saudi HQ (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SIS Global, Saudi HQ cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - VXI Global Solutions (X = Date, Y = Severity)
VXI Global Solutions cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

SIS Global, Saudi HQ

VXI Global Solutions
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
phpMyFAQ before 4.1.5 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability in GroupController::updatePermissions that allows GROUP_EDIT administrators to grant arbitrary rights to groups without verifying they hold those rights themselves. A delegated administrator can exploit this by assigning high-value permissions to a group they belong to, inheriting those rights and escalating privileges up to full administrative control.
n8n before 2.25.7 and 2.26.x before 2.26.2 contains an abstract syntax tree (AST) security validator bypass in the Python Code node. An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows containing a Python Code node can bypass the validator and access the task executor module namespace. The issue only affects self-hosted instances where the Python Task Runner is enabled; where N8N_BLOCK_RUNNER_ENV_ACCESS is configured to allow it, this can disclose environment variables accessible to the task runner process.
Grav CMS before 2.0.0-beta.2 contains multiple code-execution vulnerabilities. Three unsafe unserialize() calls - in Scheduler\JobQueue, Framework\Cache\Adapter\FileCache, and Session - deserialize untrusted data without restricting allowed classes, enabling PHP object injection and, via a gadget chain, arbitrary code execution where an attacker controls the serialized input. Additionally, InstallCommand's git clone operation passes the branch, url, and path parameters into a shell command without escaping, allowing OS command injection via plugin/theme installation (which requires admin access). A Twig security blocklist bypass (server-side template injection) is also present. The issues are fixed in 2.0.0-beta.2.
Storage Concentrator (SC & SCVM) contains a command injection vulnerability within the debug.pl script that is reachable without authentication. A remote attacker can submit a specially crafted HTTP request containing a malicious payload that is processed without adequate input sanitization, resulting in arbitrary command execution with root-level privileges on the underlying system.
Storage Concentrator (SC & SCVM) contains a command injection vulnerability in the ms_service.pl service, which listens on TCP port 9000 by default and accepts custom network packets to perform device actions. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send a specially crafted packet containing a malicious payload that is processed without adequate sanitization, resulting in arbitrary command execution with root-level privileges.