Comparison Overview
HPE SimpliVity

HPE SimpliVity
Houston, US
Last Update: 02/01/2026
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SONDA
Teatinos 500, Santiago, CL
Last Update: 13/09/2026
We are at the forefront of digital transformation in the Americas, positively impacting the lives of over 500 million people. As a key player in emerging industries, we drive innovation and change through ambitious modernization projects and cutting-edge solutions. By u...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

HPE SimpliVity







SONDA






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Information Technology & Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for HPE SimpliVity in 2026.
Incidents vs Information Technology & Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for SONDA in 2026.
Incident History - HPE SimpliVity (X = Date, Y = Severity)
HPE SimpliVity cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - SONDA (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SONDA cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

HPE SimpliVity

SONDA
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to exposure of session tokens in the HTML response.
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to an XML external entity (XXE) injection flaw.
IBM Aspera Enterprise WebApps 1.0.0 through 1.0.6 could allow a local attacker to obtain sensitive information due to cleartext transmission of sensitive information.
IBM Planning Analytics 2.0, and 2.1 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to a stack-based buffer overflow.
IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 can allow a man-in-the-middle attacker to present a forged TLS certificate, intercept the connection, and capture the IAM bearer Authorization header automatically attached by the session adapter. The captured token grants full platform-scope tenant API access, enabling the attacker to read and manipulate the victim's DataStage projects, flows, assets, and pipeline definitions. This is client-side SDK code running on the user's own machine, so exploitation requires an external network interceptor rather than a co-tenant in the shared cluster.