SimpleHelp Ltd Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (SIM1332213111025)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the SimpleHelp Ltd breach identified under incident ID SIM1332213111025.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of SimpleHelp Ltd's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/simplehelp-ltd, the number of followers: 38, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 2 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 682 and after the incident was 537 with a difference of -145 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on SimpleHelp Ltd and their customers.

A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "Sophisticated Supply-Chain Ransomware Attacks via SimpleHelp RMM Vulnerabilities (2025)", has drawn attention.

Cybersecurity researchers at Zensec exposed a supply-chain attack campaign where ransomware-as-a-service groups (Medusa and DragonForce) exploited critical vulnerabilities in SimpleHelp RMM software (CVE-2024-57726, CVE-2024-57727, CVE-2024-57728) to breach UK organizations vi...

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting SimpleHelp RMM Servers, Downstream MSP Customer Networks and Windows Endpoints, and exposing User Data (Files >1500 days old, <1500MB), Backup Infrastructure (Veeam Credentials, Hyper-V VHDX) and High-Value Targets (Domain Controllers, File Servers).

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how Ongoing (Zensec Analysis), teams are taking away lessons such as 1. Supply-chain risks from trusted third-party tools (RMM) can bypass perimeter defenses. 2. Patch management failures enable exploitation of known vulnerabilities. 3. Legitimate IT tools (PDQ, AnyDesk) can be weaponized for lateral movement. 4. Backup systems (Veeam, Hyper-V) are high-value targets for credential harvesting. 5. Double extortion (encryption + leak sites) increases pressure on victims, and recommending next steps like Audit third-party remote access tools (RMM) for vulnerabilities and misconfigurations, Verify vendor patch status and prioritize updates for critical RMM software and Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement from RMM servers.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools (T1195.002) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating supply-chain attack campaign... exploited critical vulnerabilities in SimpleHelp RMM software (CVE-2024-57726, CVE-2024-57727, CVE-2024-57728) and Valid Accounts: Local Accounts (T1078.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating backdoors established such as Local Admin Accounts (e.g., admin). Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Client Execution (T1203) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating exploiting three critical unpatched vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-57726, CVE-2024-57727, CVE-2024-57728) and Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell (T1059.003) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating weaponized SimpleHelp’s SYSTEM-level privileges to breach downstream organizations. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified External Remote Services (T1133) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating anyDesk for Persistence (DragonForce) and Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials (T1098.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating local Admin Accounts (e.g., admin). Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating weaponized SimpleHelp’s **SYSTEM-level privileges**. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating deploy ransomware (e.g., *Gaze.exe*, *.dragonforce_encrypted*), Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating disruption of IT Management Tools, and Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating leveraged the trusted RMM infrastructure to bypass security controls. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating backup Credentials (Veeam), SQL Password Stores and OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager (T1003.002) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating high-Value Targets (Domain Controllers). Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified System Information Discovery (T1082) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating high-Value Targets (Domain Controllers, File Servers, Backup Infrastructure) and System Network Configuration Discovery (T1016) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating lateral Movement via Legitimate Tools (PDQ, AnyDesk). Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating lateral Movement via Legitimate Tools (PDQ, AnyDesk) and Remote Services: Windows Remote Management (T1021.006) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating trusted RMM infrastructure to bypass security controls. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating targeting high-value assets (domain controllers, backups, financial/employee records) and Data from Network Shared Drive (T1039) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating file Servers, Backup Infrastructure (Veeam, Hyper-V). Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrate data using tools like **RClone** and **Restic** and Exfiltration to Cloud Storage: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating dragonForce Used Restic for Off-Site Backups. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (100%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware deployment (extensions such as `.MEDUSA`, `*.dragonforce_encrypted`), Data Destruction (T1485) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating loss of Backup Integrity, and Double Extortion (T1659) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating double extortion tactics included leak sites with proof-of-life data samples. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.