Comparison Overview
Shield HealthCare - Medical Supplies for Care at Home Since 1957

Shield HealthCare - Medical Supplies for Care at Home Since 1957
27911 Franklin Parkway, Valencia, 91355, US
Last Update: 05/04/2026
With 65 years of medical supply experience, Shield is a leading provider of incontinence, urological, enteral nutrition, advanced wound care, diabetes and ostomy supplies. Our mission is to serve the medical supply needs of patients at home with excellence, compassion a...

BD
1 Becton Drive, Franklin Lakes, 07417, US
Last Update: 13/09/2026
BD is one of the world's largest pure-play medical technology companies with a Purpose of advancing the world of health™ by driving innovation across medical essentials, connected care, biopharma systems and interventional. The company supports those on the frontlines o...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Shield HealthCare - Medical Supplies for Care at Home Since 1957







BD






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Medical Equipment Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Shield HealthCare - Medical Supplies for Care at Home Since 1957 in 2026.
Incidents vs Medical Equipment Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for BD in 2026.
Incident History - Shield HealthCare - Medical Supplies for Care at Home Since 1957 (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Shield HealthCare - Medical Supplies for Care at Home Since 1957 cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - BD (X = Date, Y = Severity)
BD cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Shield HealthCare - Medical Supplies for Care at Home Since 1957

BD
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.