Comparison Overview
Shared Health

Shared Health
1 Cameron Hill Circle, Chattanooga, 37402, US
Last Update: 12/08/2026
Shared Health, a wholly-owned subsidiary of BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, was created to expand our experiences and solutions in working with Medicare, Medicaid, and Special Needs populations to businesses across the country. We help managed care organizations impl...

International SOS
#17-00 Odeon Towers, Singapore, 188720, SG
Last Update: 01/04/2026
The International SOS Group of Companies has been in the business of saving lives for over 40 years. Protecting global workforces from health and security threats, we deliver customised health, security risk management and wellbeing solutions to fuel our clients’ growth...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Shared Health







International SOS






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
Shared Health has 27.54% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for International SOS in 2026.
Incident History - Shared Health (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Shared Health cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - International SOS (X = Date, Y = Severity)
International SOS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Shared Health

International SOS
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
In OpenStack Ironic before 38.0.1, the autodetect deploy interface may fail to run cleaning immediately after enrollment with, or changing to, the autodetect deploy interface.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. A user with FEATURE_BUILD_SUPPORT enabled and repository write access can exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability within the build API. This allows the user to provide a malicious URL, causing the Quay builder to make requests to internal network addresses. Such an action could lead to the disclosure of sensitive internal information.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's exported logs feature. An unauthenticated attacker with a valid file ID could download exported action logs without proper authorization. While file IDs are complex, they can be intercepted from plaintext email or webhook callbacks. This vulnerability leads to information disclosure, potentially exposing sensitive data such as usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, and action-specific metadata.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's Stripe billing webhook handler. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge billing events by sending crafted JSON requests to the `/webhooks/stripe` endpoint without validating the Stripe-Signature header. Successful exploitation can lead to the unauthorized resetting of a namespace's build quota to its maximum and trigger unsolicited billing emails to namespace administrators.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. When the SECURITY_SCANNER_V4_PSK (pre-shared key) is not set, a remote unauthenticated attacker can send POST requests to the security scanner notification endpoint. This allows the attacker to flood the notification queue and inject path traversal characters into Clair API URL paths. The primary consequence is worker resource exhaustion and blind path manipulation on the configured Clair host, potentially leading to a denial of service.