Comparison Overview
Sharaka Holdings

Sharaka Holdings
P.O. Box 1108, Doha, Qatar, 1108, QA
Last Update: 06/01/2026
Sharaka Holdings was founded over 50 years ago and was originally known as The General Trading Group. Sharaka now operates in 4 sectors with over 2,700 skilled professionals. Our diverse portfolio covers: - Real Estate & Hospitality - Education - Wellness - Trading & ...

Sonae
Maia, Porto, 4470-177, PT
Last Update: 04/04/2026
Sonae exists to create a lasting positive impact on businesses, people, communities and on the planet. Managing a diverse portfolio of businesses in retail, financial services, technology, investments, real estate and telecommunications, Sonae makes the most of its ex...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Sharaka Holdings







Sonae






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Investment Management Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Sharaka Holdings in 2026.
Incidents vs Investment Management Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Sonae in 2026.
Incident History - Sharaka Holdings (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Sharaka Holdings cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Sonae (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Sonae cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Sharaka Holdings

Sonae
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
phpMyFAQ before 4.1.5 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability in GroupController::updatePermissions that allows GROUP_EDIT administrators to grant arbitrary rights to groups without verifying they hold those rights themselves. A delegated administrator can exploit this by assigning high-value permissions to a group they belong to, inheriting those rights and escalating privileges up to full administrative control.
n8n before 2.25.7 and 2.26.x before 2.26.2 contains an abstract syntax tree (AST) security validator bypass in the Python Code node. An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows containing a Python Code node can bypass the validator and access the task executor module namespace. The issue only affects self-hosted instances where the Python Task Runner is enabled; where N8N_BLOCK_RUNNER_ENV_ACCESS is configured to allow it, this can disclose environment variables accessible to the task runner process.
Grav CMS before 2.0.0-beta.2 contains multiple code-execution vulnerabilities. Three unsafe unserialize() calls - in Scheduler\JobQueue, Framework\Cache\Adapter\FileCache, and Session - deserialize untrusted data without restricting allowed classes, enabling PHP object injection and, via a gadget chain, arbitrary code execution where an attacker controls the serialized input. Additionally, InstallCommand's git clone operation passes the branch, url, and path parameters into a shell command without escaping, allowing OS command injection via plugin/theme installation (which requires admin access). A Twig security blocklist bypass (server-side template injection) is also present. The issues are fixed in 2.0.0-beta.2.
Storage Concentrator (SC & SCVM) contains a command injection vulnerability within the debug.pl script that is reachable without authentication. A remote attacker can submit a specially crafted HTTP request containing a malicious payload that is processed without adequate input sanitization, resulting in arbitrary command execution with root-level privileges on the underlying system.
Storage Concentrator (SC & SCVM) contains a command injection vulnerability in the ms_service.pl service, which listens on TCP port 9000 by default and accepts custom network packets to perform device actions. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send a specially crafted packet containing a malicious payload that is processed without adequate sanitization, resulting in arbitrary command execution with root-level privileges.