Comparison Overview
SGS Connectivity & Products

SGS Connectivity & Products
1 Place des Alpes, 1211 Geneva 1, P.O. Box 2152, CH
Last Update: 15/03/2026
SGS’s Connectivity & Products division provides the world’s most comprehensive range of inspection, testing, certification and advisory services, powered by leading technology and digital tools. Our global network of experts supports you at every stage – from design, pr...

PwC
1 Embankment Place, GB
Last Update: 19/06/2026
At PwC, we help clients drive their companies to the leading edge. We’re a tech-forward, people-empowered network with more than 370,000 people in 149 countries. Across audit and assurance, tax and legal, deals and consulting we help build, accelerate and sustain moment...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

SGS Connectivity & Products







PwC






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Professional Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for SGS Connectivity & Products in 2026.
Incidents vs Professional Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for PwC in 2026.
Incident History - SGS Connectivity & Products (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SGS Connectivity & Products cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - PwC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
PwC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

SGS Connectivity & Products

PwC
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.