Comparison Overview
Electrozad

Electrozad
51 Vinyl Ct, Vaughan, Ontario, CA, L4L 4A3
Last Update: 15/03/2026
Sesco (a division of Sonepar Canada) is a full line electrical distributor serving residential, commercial and industrial contractors in the Greater Toronto Area. Established in 1922, we have 11 branches in the GTA and Eastern Ontario. Our team of experienced and kn...

Ferguson
751 Lakefront Commons, Newport News, Virginia, US, 23606
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Since 1953, Ferguson has been a leading source of quality supplies for a variety of industries. We are proud to provide world-class products and services to a customer base that is as vast and varied as our inventory. The professionals we serve help transform the world ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Electrozad







Ferguson






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Wholesale Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Electrozad in 2026.
Incidents vs Wholesale Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Ferguson in 2026.
Incident History - Electrozad (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Electrozad cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Ferguson (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Ferguson cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Electrozad

Ferguson
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.