Comparison Overview
Sellmark Corporation

Sellmark Corporation
2201 Heritage Parkway, Mansfield, 76063, US
Last Update: 04/04/2026
Sellmark Corporation stands out in the manufacturing, technology, and consumer products industry for making, marketing, and moving products that improve people’s lives. Our innovative "Sellmarketing" system integrates user-focused marketing, efficient manufacturing, and...

ITC Limited
Virginia House, 37 J L Nehru Road, Kolkata, West Bengal, IN, 700071
Last Update: 14/09/2026
ITC is one of India's foremost private sector companies with a Gross Revenue of ₹ 73,465 crores and EBITDA of ₹ 24,025 crores (as on 31.03.2025). ITC has a diversified presence in FMCG, Packaging, Paperboards & Specialty Papers and Agri-Business. ITC's aspiration to be ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Sellmark Corporation







ITC Limited






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Sellmark Corporation in 2026.
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ITC Limited in 2026.
Incident History - Sellmark Corporation (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Sellmark Corporation cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - ITC Limited (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ITC Limited cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Sellmark Corporation

ITC Limited
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.