Comparison Overview
Sei Brasil (Sumitomo Electric Group Company)

Sei Brasil (Sumitomo Electric Group Company)
Avenida Victor Andrew, 1209, Sorocaba, 18086-390, BR
Last Update: 01/04/2026
For over 30 years present in the brazilian market of telecommunications, SUMITOMO ELETRIC INDUSTRIES now has a manufacturing unit, SEI BRASIL Soluções Ópticas, in the city of Sorocaba - SP, for the manufacture of optical fiber cables and supply of solutions for FTTH net...

Kellogg Company
One Kellogg Square, Battle Creek, 49017, US
Last Update: 13/09/2026
At Kellanova, our vision is to be the world’s best performing snacks-led powerhouse, unleashing the full potential of our differentiated brands and our passionate people. Powered by our strategy to Differentiate, Drive & Deliver, we are a leading company in global snac...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Sei Brasil (Sumitomo Electric Group Company)







Kellogg Company






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Sei Brasil (Sumitomo Electric Group Company) in 2026.
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Kellogg Company in 2026.
Incident History - Sei Brasil (Sumitomo Electric Group Company) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Sei Brasil (Sumitomo Electric Group Company) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Kellogg Company (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Kellogg Company cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Sei Brasil (Sumitomo Electric Group Company)

Kellogg Company
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.