Comparison Overview
SEAT & CUPRA Stockholm

SEAT & CUPRA Stockholm
Murmästarvägen 35, Stockholm, Stockholm County, 127 35, SE
Last Update: 02/04/2026
SEAT & CUPRA Stockholm är en del av Din Bil Sverige AB, ett helägt dotterbolag till Porsche Holding GmbH. Vi har marknadens största sortiment av nya och begagnade SEAT-bilar. Vi erbjuder alltid förmånlig finansiering och försäkring. Våra fullserviceanläggningar är topp...

Iveco Group
Via Puglia 35, Torino, 10156, IT
Last Update: 21/09/2026
Iveco Group N.V. (MI: IVG) is the home of unique people and brands that power your business and mission to advance a more sustainable society. The seven brands are each a major force in its specific business: IVECO, a pioneering commercial vehicles brand that designs, m...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

SEAT & CUPRA Stockholm







Iveco Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for SEAT & CUPRA Stockholm in 2026.
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Iveco Group in 2026.
Incident History - SEAT & CUPRA Stockholm (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SEAT & CUPRA Stockholm cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Iveco Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Iveco Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

SEAT & CUPRA Stockholm

Iveco Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.