Comparison Overview
ScreenBeam Inc.

ScreenBeam Inc.
220 Devcon Drive, San Jose, 95113, US
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Creating safer, easier and smarter work areas are essential to corporations and schools worldwide as they consider how to transition back to the office or campus. ScreenBeam provides the only app-free wireless presentation system that eliminates all contact points and ...

AlmavivA Group
Via di Casal Boccone, 188-190, Roma, IT, 00137
Last Update: 11/09/2026
Almaviva is the Italian digital innovation group that supports the country’s growth by helping enterprises meet the challenges of staying competitive in the digital age. The Group helps organizations transform their business models, operational structures, corporate cul...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ScreenBeam Inc.







AlmavivA Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ScreenBeam Inc. in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for AlmavivA Group in 2026.
Incident History - ScreenBeam Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ScreenBeam Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - AlmavivA Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
AlmavivA Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ScreenBeam Inc.

AlmavivA Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.