Comparison Overview
School Spider By IRIS

School Spider By IRIS
Didsbury Business Centre, Manchester, Lancashire, M20 2PW, GB
Last Update: 21/12/2025
Empowering primary schools and Multi Academy Trusts with a unified all in one solution that allows them to communicate with parents seamlessly. Our mission was to build one system that schools and trusts could use for everything from website management, communication ...

Secretaria de Educação do Estado de Pernambuco
BR
Last Update: 02/04/2026
For 52 years, the Department of Education of Pernambuco was linked to the health department of the State. The disconnect between the two bodies and the consequent acquisition of autonomy of the SE came through Law 466, on 22 April 1949, during the administration of then...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

School Spider By IRIS







Secretaria de Educação do Estado de Pernambuco






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Education Management Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for School Spider By IRIS in 2026.
Incidents vs Education Management Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Secretaria de Educação do Estado de Pernambuco in 2026.
Incident History - School Spider By IRIS (X = Date, Y = Severity)
School Spider By IRIS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Secretaria de Educação do Estado de Pernambuco (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Secretaria de Educação do Estado de Pernambuco cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

School Spider By IRIS

Secretaria de Educação do Estado de Pernambuco
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.