Comparison Overview
Southern California Edison (SCE)

Southern California Edison (SCE)
2244 Walnut Grove Ave., Rosemead, 91770, US
Last Update: 09/09/2026
As one of the nation’s largest electric utilities, we’re bringing more clean and renewable sources of energy to Southern California. From energy storage to transportation electrification, our employees are working on innovative projects that will help cut emissions an...

Framatome
1 place Jean Millier, Courbevoie, FR, 92400
Last Update: 14/09/2026
Framatome is an international leader in nuclear energy recognized for its innovative, digital and value added solutions for the global nuclear fleet. With worldwide expertise and a proven track record for reliability and performance, the company designs, services and in...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Southern California Edison (SCE)







Framatome






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Utilities Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Southern California Edison (SCE) in 2026.
Incidents vs Utilities Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Framatome in 2026.
Incident History - Southern California Edison (SCE) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Southern California Edison (SCE) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Framatome (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Framatome cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Southern California Edison (SCE)

Framatome
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.