Comparison Overview
Samsung Electronics UK

Samsung Electronics UK
Samsung House, Chertsey, KT16 0PS, GB
Last Update: 17/03/2026
Welcome to Samsung. For over 70 years, Samsung has been dedicated to making a better world through diverse businesses that today span advanced technology, semiconductors, skyscraper and plant construction, petrochemicals, fashion, medicine, finance, hotels and more....

Flex
12455 Research Blvd, Austin, Texas, US, 78759
Last Update: 13/09/2026
Flex (Reg. No. 199002645H) is the global manufacturing partner of choice that helps leading brands design, build, and manage products that improve the world. For more information, visit flex.com. We love to hear your thoughts, comments and ideas so feel free to like, s...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Samsung Electronics UK







Flex






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Samsung Electronics UK in 2026.
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Flex in 2026.
Incident History - Samsung Electronics UK (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Samsung Electronics UK cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Flex (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Flex cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Samsung Electronics UK

Flex
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.