Comparison Overview
Salus Uruguay 

Salus Uruguay
WTC- Torre 1 Piso 18, Montevideo, undefined, 11300, UY
Last Update: 14/12/2025
Más 130 años siendo parte de los uruguayos, han hecho de Salus, toda una tradición. Ubicados en el corazón del Uruguay, producimos y distribuimos desde 1892, el agua mineral que emana de la Fuente del Puma en las Sierras de Minas. En el año 2000 nos unimos al Grupo ...

Frito-Lay
7701 Legacy Dr, Plano, 75024, US
Last Update: 04/04/2026
We believe every consumer should have access to their favorite snack, everywhere. We own the manufacturing process from seed to shelf and actively invest in technology to automate key steps of the process. This helps us be more agile in what we need to make, who we need...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Salus Uruguay







Frito-Lay






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Food and Beverage Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Salus Uruguay in 2026.
Incidents vs Food and Beverage Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Frito-Lay in 2026.
Incident History - Salus Uruguay (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Salus Uruguay cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Frito-Lay (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Frito-Lay cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Salus Uruguay

Frito-Lay
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size calculation, resulting in a heap allocation smaller than expected. Subsequent initialization of the buffer wrote beyond the end of the allocation. An unprivileged local user with access to a vt(4) device can trigger an out-of-bounds write in the kernel, potentially escalating privileges.
The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen. An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.
Second, the audio buffer backing a mapping could be freed when the device was closed even though the mapping remained valid. The freed memory could then be reused elsewhere while still accessible through the stale mapping. The /dev/dsp device nodes are world-accessible by default. On a system with an audio device, either issue allows an unprivileged local user to read and write kernel memory, which can be used to escalate privileges, potentially gaining full control of the affected system. At a minimum, an attacker can crash the kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The Linuxulator determined whether a binary was set-user-ID or set-group-ID by checking the P_SUGID process flag. During execve(2), this flag is not yet set at the point where the auxiliary vector is constructed, so AT_SECURE was incorrectly set to zero for set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables. An unprivileged local user can inject a shared library via LD_PRELOAD into a set-user-ID or set-group-ID Linux binary, gaining the privileges of that binary.
The kernel handler for IPV6_MSFILTER dropped a serializing lock in order to copy the source-filter list from userspace, then reacquired the lock. During this window another thread could free the multicast filter structure, leaving the handler with a stale pointer to freed memory. An unprivileged local user can exploit this use-after-free to escalate privileges.