Comparison Overview
SAECOWilson

SAECOWilson
NZ
Last Update: 17/03/2026
SAECOWilson formed through the merger in 2011 of Wilson Bros (established in 1919) and SAECOPRECISION (established 1963) and now form part of the Motion New Zealand Ltd. We specialise in the distribution of Bearings, Power Transmission and Engineering Supplies to the N...

SKF Group
Sven Wingquist Gata 2, Göteborg, SE-415 50, SE
Last Update: 23/09/2026
We fight friction to move the world forward. 20% of all energy consumed is spent overcoming friction. At SKF, we’re constantly fighting that friction, to reduce energy waste and make the most of the resources we have. Since 1907, we’ve been making some of the world’...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

SAECOWilson







SKF Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Industrial Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for SAECOWilson in 2026.
Incidents vs Industrial Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for SKF Group in 2026.
Incident History - SAECOWilson (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SAECOWilson cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - SKF Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SKF Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

SAECOWilson

SKF Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.