Comparison Overview
S3EB, the Smart Building Division of Bouygues Bâtiment Grand Ouest

S3EB, the Smart Building Division of Bouygues Bâtiment Grand Ouest
8b avenue Jean Rondeaux , Rouen, 76000, FR
Last Update: 09/01/2026
S3EB, the commercial brand of the Smart Building Division of Bouygues Bâtiment Grand Ouest, based in Rouen (France), has been supporting its clients since 1985 with expertise covering all technical trades required for turnkey Smart Building projects. S3EB specializes in...

Hassan Allam Holding
Yehia Zakaria Street, Industrial-Lot 5, Sheraton Helioplis Housing., Cairo, EG
Last Update: 12/09/2026
Hassan Allam Holding is a leading group with a focus on engineering and construction, and investment and development. The Group operates in diverse sectors including infrastructure, energy, water, industrial, logistics, petrochemical, and complex large-scale projects in...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

S3EB, the Smart Building Division of Bouygues Bâtiment Grand Ouest







Hassan Allam Holding






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for S3EB, the Smart Building Division of Bouygues Bâtiment Grand Ouest in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Hassan Allam Holding in 2026.
Incident History - S3EB, the Smart Building Division of Bouygues Bâtiment Grand Ouest (X = Date, Y = Severity)
S3EB, the Smart Building Division of Bouygues Bâtiment Grand Ouest cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Hassan Allam Holding (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Hassan Allam Holding cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

S3EB, the Smart Building Division of Bouygues Bâtiment Grand Ouest

Hassan Allam Holding
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.