Comparison Overview
RS Eastern Europe

RS Eastern Europe
Domaniewska 48, Warsaw, 02-672, PL
Last Update: 22/11/2025
Welcome to RS Eastern Europe! We are a global B2B multichannel distributor, revolutionising the industrial and electronics industries. We provide product and service solutions to meet the industrial and engineering challenges of today and tomorrow. With over 8000 emplo...

TE Connectivity
Galway, IE
Last Update: 23/09/2026
TE Connectivity plc (NYSE: TEL) is a global industrial technology leader creating a safer, sustainable, productive and connected future. As a trusted innovation partner, our broad range of connectivity and sensor solutions enable the distribution of power, signal and da...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

RS Eastern Europe







TE Connectivity






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for RS Eastern Europe in 2026.
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for TE Connectivity in 2026.
Incident History - RS Eastern Europe (X = Date, Y = Severity)
RS Eastern Europe cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - TE Connectivity (X = Date, Y = Severity)
TE Connectivity cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

RS Eastern Europe

TE Connectivity
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.