Comparison Overview
Rotoflow, An Air Products Business

Rotoflow, An Air Products Business
2320 Highland Ave, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, 18020, US
Last Update: 30/04/2026
As a turbomachinery company blended with world-leading industrial gas operating expertise, Rotoflow, an Air Products Business, is able to draw on decades of experience and operational know-how to design, build, and support mission-critical turbomachinery for the industr...

Shell
York Road, London, SE1 7NA, GB
Last Update: 17/09/2026
Shell is a global group of energy and petrochemical companies, employing 96,000 people across 70+ countries. We serve around 1 million commercial and industrial customers, and around 33 million customers daily at our Shell-branded retail service stations. Our purpose i...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Rotoflow, An Air Products Business







Shell






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Oil and Gas Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Rotoflow, An Air Products Business in 2026.
Incidents vs Oil and Gas Industry Avg (This Year)
Shell has 292.16% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Rotoflow, An Air Products Business (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Rotoflow, An Air Products Business cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Shell (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Shell cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Rotoflow, An Air Products Business

Shell
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.