Comparison Overview
Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc.

Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc.
1500 Don Mills Rd, Toronto, M3B 3K4, CA
Last Update: 12/03/2026
Leading Canada’s transition away from cigarettes. At RBH, we think big, start small, and move fast by celebrating diversity of opinions to ensure the best ideas win. Our staff of almost 800 at eight different locations across the country fuel the innovation that has m...

JTI
8, rue Kazem Radjavi, Geneva, 1202, CH
Last Update: 13/09/2026
We’re JTI, Japan Tobacco International and we believe in freedom. We think that the possibilities are limitless when you’re free to choose. In fact, we’ve spent over 20 years innovating, creating new and better products for our consumers to choose from. It’s how we’ve g...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc.







JTI






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Tobacco Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. in 2026.
Incidents vs Tobacco Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for JTI in 2026.
Incident History - Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - JTI (X = Date, Y = Severity)
JTI cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc.

JTI
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.