Comparison Overview
Rolls-Royce Singapore Hub

Rolls-Royce Singapore Hub
1 Seletar Aerospace Crescent, Seletar, 797565, SG
Last Update: 10/12/2025
Rolls-Royce develops and delivers complex power and propulsion solutions for safety-critical applications in the air, at sea and on land. Singapore serves as a strategic hub for our global corporate capabilities as well as regional Civil Aerospace, Power Systems and De...

Bilfinger
Oskar-Meixner-Straße 1, Mannheim, 68163, DE
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Bilfinger is an international industrial services provider with a vision to be the No. 1 for its customers in enhancing efficiency and sustainability within the process industry. Bilfinger’s comprehensive portfolio spans the entire value chain, from consulting & enginee...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Rolls-Royce Singapore Hub







Bilfinger






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Industrial Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Rolls-Royce Singapore Hub in 2026.
Incidents vs Industrial Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Bilfinger in 2026.
Incident History - Rolls-Royce Singapore Hub (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Rolls-Royce Singapore Hub cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Bilfinger (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Bilfinger cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Rolls-Royce Singapore Hub

Bilfinger
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras certificate-related upload interfaces allow authenticated users to store arbitrary file content to fixed, persistent filesystem locations without validating file type, structure, or size. This design omission enables the placement of unexpected or malformed data in locations intended for trusted certificate material, which could affect system integrity or behavior even after reboot.
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras that could allow an authenticated user to supply unsanitized XML fields to the device's certificate generation interface, which are incorporated into a backend certificate creation command without proper input validation. This may allow for command execution with elevated privileges during certificate generation.
The DMP-5000 file service exposes authenticated arbitrary file upload functionality. There are exposed endpoints which allows authenticated users to upload files of any type without validation. No file extension filtering or content inspection is enforced which allows executable binaries and scripts to be accepted and written directly to the server.
The DMP-5000 devices are shipped with a default administrative web account with weak authentication controls, which are not required to be changed during initial configuration or operation. Using these accounts provides full system access.
Various versions of Daktronics Controller Firmware could allow authenticated and unauthenticated remote users to escape the intended directory and enumerate arbitrary file system paths.