Comparison Overview
Richard Allitt Associates Ltd

Richard Allitt Associates Ltd
Cuckfield Road, Staplefield, GB
Last Update: 04/12/2025
Richard Allitt Associates is a leading provider of hydraulic engineering and flood risk consultancy for the urban drainage industry. We operate nationally and specialise in hydraulic modelling, drainage design and flood mitigation services for a range of sectors includi...

GHD
133 Castlereagh St, Sydney, 2000, AU
Last Update: 04/04/2026
We are committed to addressing the world’s biggest challenges in the areas of water, energy and communities. GHD is a global network of multi-disciplinary professionals providing clients with integrated solutions through engineering, environmental, design and construct...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Richard Allitt Associates Ltd







GHD






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Civil Engineering Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Richard Allitt Associates Ltd in 2026.
Incidents vs Civil Engineering Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for GHD in 2026.
Incident History - Richard Allitt Associates Ltd (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Richard Allitt Associates Ltd cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - GHD (X = Date, Y = Severity)
GHD cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Richard Allitt Associates Ltd

GHD
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.