Comparison Overview
Riachuelo

Riachuelo
Rua Lemos Monteiro, 120, Butantã, São Paulo, São Paulo 05501-050, BR
Last Update: 23/04/2026
A Riachuelo é a maior empresa de moda do Brasil! São 213 lojas distribuídas por todo o País e tem previsão de chegar a 300 lojas até o final de 2015. A Riachuelo faz parte do Grupo Guararapes, que é o maior grupo de confecção de roupas da América Latina com dois parqu...

Pick n Pay
PnP Office Park, Kenilworth, 7708, ZA
Last Update: 29/05/2026
Welcome to Pick n Pay, where family values and customer-centricity converge to create an unparalleled shopping experience. Since 1967, when the visionary Raymond Ackerman championed the cause of consumers by acquiring the first few stores, the Ackerman family's dedicati...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Riachuelo







Pick n Pay






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Riachuelo in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Pick n Pay in 2026.
Incident History - Riachuelo (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Riachuelo cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Pick n Pay (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Pick n Pay cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Riachuelo

Pick n Pay
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.