Comparison Overview
RGIS-Brasil
RGIS-Brasil
Rua Niterói 400, São Caetano do Sul, 09510-200, BR
Last Update: 13/02/2026
Improve the profitability of your business. Partner with us to reach your asset optimization goals
Stantec
10160-112 Street, Edmonton, T5K 2L6, CA
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Stantec empowers clients, people, and communities to rise to the world’s greatest challenges at a time when the world faces more unprecedented concerns than ever before. We are a global leader in sustainable engineering, architecture, and environmental consulting. Ou...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
RGIS-Brasil
Stantec
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Business Consulting and Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for RGIS-Brasil in 2026.
Incidents vs Business Consulting and Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Stantec in 2026.
Incident History - RGIS-Brasil (X = Date, Y = Severity)
RGIS-Brasil cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Stantec (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Stantec cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
RGIS-Brasil
Stantec
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to exposure of session tokens in the HTML response.
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to an XML external entity (XXE) injection flaw.
IBM Aspera Enterprise WebApps 1.0.0 through 1.0.6 could allow a local attacker to obtain sensitive information due to cleartext transmission of sensitive information.
IBM Planning Analytics 2.0, and 2.1 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to a stack-based buffer overflow.
IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 can allow a man-in-the-middle attacker to present a forged TLS certificate, intercept the connection, and capture the IAM bearer Authorization header automatically attached by the session adapter. The captured token grants full platform-scope tenant API access, enabling the attacker to read and manipulate the victim's DataStage projects, flows, assets, and pipeline definitions. This is client-side SDK code running on the user's own machine, so exploitation requires an external network interceptor rather than a co-tenant in the shared cluster.