Comparison Overview
Shine - Sanitary Ware & Fittings

Shine - Sanitary Ware & Fittings
PRAN-RFL Centre. 105, Progoti Sarani Middle Badda , Dhaka, 1212, BD
Last Update: 21/04/2026
SHINE is one of the most prominent brands of RFL. Shine represents elegant sanitary ware & fittings that suit your choice. Shine has Tap, Shower, Tissue Holder, Flush Tank, and more than 400 essential bathroom fittings that not only fulfill the need but also modernize t...

METRO/MAKRO
Metro-Str. 1, Duesseldorf, 40235, DE
Last Update: 31/03/2026
METRO is a leading international wholesale company with food and non-food assortments that specialises in serving the needs of hotels, restaurants and caterers (HoReCa) as well as independent traders. Around the world, METRO has 15 million customers who can choose wheth...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Shine - Sanitary Ware & Fittings







METRO/MAKRO






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Wholesale Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Shine - Sanitary Ware & Fittings in 2026.
Incidents vs Wholesale Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for METRO/MAKRO in 2026.
Incident History - Shine - Sanitary Ware & Fittings (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Shine - Sanitary Ware & Fittings cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - METRO/MAKRO (X = Date, Y = Severity)
METRO/MAKRO cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Shine - Sanitary Ware & Fittings

METRO/MAKRO
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.