Comparison Overview
Rev-A-Shelf
Rev-A-Shelf
12400 Earl Jones Way, None, Louisville, KY, US, 40299
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Established in 1978 as a division of Jones Plastic & Engineering, our product line began as Lazy Susan components and has grown to include thousands of innovative storage and organization products for the kitchen and bath. With the acquisition of Tresco Lighting in 2011...
Henkel
Henkelstraße 67, Düsseldorf, 40589, DE
Last Update: 11/09/2026
Henkel operates worldwide with leading innovations, brands and technologies in two business areas: Adhesive Technologies and Consumer Brands. Founded in 1876, Henkel looks back on more than 145 years of success. The company holds leading positions with its two business...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Rev-A-Shelf
Henkel
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Rev-A-Shelf in 2026.
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Henkel in 2026.
Incident History - Rev-A-Shelf (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Rev-A-Shelf cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Henkel (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Henkel cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Rev-A-Shelf
Henkel
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.