Comparison Overview
Repom S.A.

Repom S.A.
Al. Tocantins, 350 - 15º Andar, Barueri, São Paulo, 06455020, BR
Last Update: 05/12/2025
Com mais de 30 anos de experiência no mercado a Repom possui Soluções para Transporte Rodoviário de Cargas com Gestão de Frete, Pedágio e Pagamento de despesas. 🧑💻 💰 Atendemos a sua necessidade para: 🚐🚚 #movercargas: • Caminhoneiros autônomos • Frotas Próprias...

Transnet Freight Rail
15 Girton Road. Parktown , Johannesburg , 2193, ZA
Last Update: 13/09/2026
Transnet Freight Rail is the largest division of Transnet SOC Ltd. It is a world class heavy haul freight rail company that specialises in the transportation of freight. The company maintains an extensive rail network across South Africa that connects with other rail n...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Repom S.A.







Transnet Freight Rail






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Truck Transportation Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Repom S.A. in 2026.
Incidents vs Truck Transportation Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Transnet Freight Rail in 2026.
Incident History - Repom S.A. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Repom S.A. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Transnet Freight Rail (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Transnet Freight Rail cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Repom S.A.

Transnet Freight Rail
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.