Comparison Overview
Ray Sigorta
Ray Sigorta
Haydar Aliyev Caddesi, Sariyer, Istanbul, TR, 34457
Last Update: 08/11/2025
Ray Sigorta olarak, ulaştırma sektörünün en önemli kuruluşları olan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Demir Yolları, Denizcilik İşletmeleri ve Türk Hava Yolları’nın ortak girişimiyle 1958 yılından itibaren sigorta sektöründe faaliyet gösteriyoruz. 1992 yılında Doğan Holding ...
Lockton
Global, US
Last Update: 04/09/2026
What makes Lockton stand apart is also what makes us better: independence. Our private ownership empowers our 13,100+ Associates doing business in over 140+ countries to focus solely on clients' risk and insurance needs. With expertise that reaches around the globe, we ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Ray Sigorta
Lockton
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Ray Sigorta in 2026.
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Lockton in 2026.
Incident History - Ray Sigorta (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Ray Sigorta cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Lockton (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Lockton cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Ray Sigorta
Lockton
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to exposure of session tokens in the HTML response.
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to an XML external entity (XXE) injection flaw.
IBM Aspera Enterprise WebApps 1.0.0 through 1.0.6 could allow a local attacker to obtain sensitive information due to cleartext transmission of sensitive information.
IBM Planning Analytics 2.0, and 2.1 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to a stack-based buffer overflow.
IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 can allow a man-in-the-middle attacker to present a forged TLS certificate, intercept the connection, and capture the IAM bearer Authorization header automatically attached by the session adapter. The captured token grants full platform-scope tenant API access, enabling the attacker to read and manipulate the victim's DataStage projects, flows, assets, and pipeline definitions. This is client-side SDK code running on the user's own machine, so exploitation requires an external network interceptor rather than a co-tenant in the shared cluster.