Comparison Overview
Rakuten Blockchain Lab

Rakuten Blockchain Lab
Alexander House, Belfast, Northern Ireland, BT2 8HD, GB
Last Update: 02/12/2025
This is the homepage for the Rakuten Blockchain Lab. We are a software engineering team founded in 2016 as part of the Japanese headquartered Rakuten, Inc. (TSE: 4755) which is a global leader in internet services. Our team members are based in Belfast, Tokyo and Bang...

eClerx
29 Bank Street, Fort, 1st Floor, Mumbai, Maharashtra, IN, 400 023
Last Update: 08/09/2026
eClerx is a productized services company, bringing together people, technology and domain expertise to amplify business results. Our mission is to set the benchmark for client service and success in our industry. Our vision is to be the innovation partner of choice for ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Rakuten Blockchain Lab







eClerx






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Rakuten Blockchain Lab in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for eClerx in 2026.
Incident History - Rakuten Blockchain Lab (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Rakuten Blockchain Lab cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - eClerx (X = Date, Y = Severity)
eClerx cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Rakuten Blockchain Lab

eClerx
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.