Comparison Overview
QuikSTATS

QuikSTATS
N/A
Last Update: 23/04/2026
QuikSTATS is a self-service solution that allows teams to undertake C2 (PAS128-D) utility searches for a clearer picture of critical underground infrastructure, at a fraction of the cost and time of traditional methods. Developed in 2021, QuikSTATS was launched to enab...

GMR Group
New Udaan Bhawan, New Delhi, 110037, IN
Last Update: 01/09/2026
GMR Group is a leading Indian infrastructure conglomerate with a diversified presence across Airports, Energy, Transportation, Urban Infrastructure, and Sports. With over two decades of experience, the Group has built world-class assets and pioneered innovations in sust...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

QuikSTATS







GMR Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for QuikSTATS in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for GMR Group in 2026.
Incident History - QuikSTATS (X = Date, Y = Severity)
QuikSTATS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - GMR Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
GMR Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

QuikSTATS

GMR Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.