Comparison Overview
Quectel

Quectel
Building 5, Shanghai Business Park Phase III (Area B), No.1016 Tianlin Road, Minhang District, 200233, CN
Last Update: 11/08/2026
Quectel’s passion for a smarter world drives us to accelerate IoT innovation. A highly customer-centric organization, we are a global IoT solutions provider backed by outstanding support and services. Our growing global team of over 4,000 professionals sets the pace for...

TELUS
510 West Georgia St., Vancouver, V6B 0M3, CA
Last Update: 29/07/2026
At TELUS, our purpose-driven team works together every day to innovate and do good. From providing technology solutions that make our lives safer and easier, to supporting those who need it most, our inclusive, spirited and giving people are passionate about empowering ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Quectel







TELUS






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
Quectel has 46.24% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
TELUS has 385.44% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Quectel (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Quectel cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - TELUS (X = Date, Y = Severity)
TELUS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Quectel

TELUS
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
In OpenStack Ironic before 38.0.1, the autodetect deploy interface may fail to run cleaning immediately after enrollment with, or changing to, the autodetect deploy interface.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. A user with FEATURE_BUILD_SUPPORT enabled and repository write access can exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability within the build API. This allows the user to provide a malicious URL, causing the Quay builder to make requests to internal network addresses. Such an action could lead to the disclosure of sensitive internal information.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's exported logs feature. An unauthenticated attacker with a valid file ID could download exported action logs without proper authorization. While file IDs are complex, they can be intercepted from plaintext email or webhook callbacks. This vulnerability leads to information disclosure, potentially exposing sensitive data such as usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, and action-specific metadata.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's Stripe billing webhook handler. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge billing events by sending crafted JSON requests to the `/webhooks/stripe` endpoint without validating the Stripe-Signature header. Successful exploitation can lead to the unauthorized resetting of a namespace's build quota to its maximum and trigger unsolicited billing emails to namespace administrators.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. When the SECURITY_SCANNER_V4_PSK (pre-shared key) is not set, a remote unauthenticated attacker can send POST requests to the security scanner notification endpoint. This allows the attacker to flood the notification queue and inject path traversal characters into Clair API URL paths. The primary consequence is worker resource exhaustion and blind path manipulation on the configured Clair host, potentially leading to a denial of service.