Comparison Overview
Délégation générale du Québec à Tokyo (DGQT)

Délégation générale du Québec à Tokyo (DGQT)
Tokyo, JP
Last Update: 28/03/2026
La délégation générale est le plus important des postes du Québec à l’étranger. Elle est dirigée par un délégué nommé par le gouvernement. Elle offre des services dans les secteurs de l’économie, de l’éducation, de la culture, et des affaires publiques. Elle emploie un ...

Workingfor.be
Simon Bolivarlaan 30, Brussels, 1000, BE
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Workingfor.be is the job platform of the federal administration. Here, you will find a wide variety of jobs in different fields of profession. Every day thousands of our employees help build tomorrow's society. When you choose the federal administration, you choos...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Délégation générale du Québec à Tokyo (DGQT)







Workingfor.be






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Délégation générale du Québec à Tokyo (DGQT) in 2026.
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Workingfor.be in 2026.
Incident History - Délégation générale du Québec à Tokyo (DGQT) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Délégation générale du Québec à Tokyo (DGQT) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Workingfor.be (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Workingfor.be cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Délégation générale du Québec à Tokyo (DGQT)

Workingfor.be
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.