Comparison Overview
Qualcomm Automotive

Qualcomm Automotive
N/A
Last Update: 04/07/2026
We’re helping to define the intelligent mobility generation through the Snapdragon Digital Chassis: a comprehensive suite of cloud-connected platforms that power next-generation vehicle experiences. From advanced driver assistance and automated driving to immersive in-v...

ASML
De Run 6501, Veldhoven, 5504DR, NL
Last Update: 12/09/2026
Who are we? ASML is an innovation leader in the global semiconductor industry. We make machines that chipmakers use to mass produce microchips. Founded in 1984 in the Netherlands with just a handful of employees, we’ve now grown to over 40,000 employees, 143 nationalit...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Qualcomm Automotive







ASML






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Qualcomm Automotive in 2026.
Incidents vs Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
ASML has 2.91% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Qualcomm Automotive (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Qualcomm Automotive cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - ASML (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ASML cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Qualcomm Automotive

ASML
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.