Comparison Overview
Qihoo 360

Qihoo 360
酒仙桥路6号院(电子城·国际电子总部)2号楼, 朝阳区, CN
Last Update: 08/03/2026
Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd. (NYSE: QIHU) is a leading Internet company in China. The Company is also the number one provider of Internet and mobile security products in China as measured by its user base, according to iResearch. Qihoo 360 also provides users with secu...

Fanatics
95 Morton St, New York, 10014, US
Last Update: 04/09/2026
Fanatics is committed to relentlessly enhancing the fan experience. As a leading global sports platform, Fanatics allows fans to buy, bet, and collect while engaging with sports in deeper, more immersive ways. Fanatics is redefining how fans connect with their favorit...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Qihoo 360







Fanatics






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)
Qihoo 360 has 38.65% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Fanatics in 2026.
Incident History - Qihoo 360 (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Qihoo 360 cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Fanatics (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Fanatics cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Qihoo 360

Fanatics
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.