Comparison Overview
Qatar Islamic Bank (QIB)

Qatar Islamic Bank (QIB)
Grand Hamad Street, Doha, 559, QA
Last Update: 07/03/2026
Qatar Islamic Bank (QIB) was the first Islamic bank to start operating in the country in 1982 and it is still the largest today: the Bank currently holds 42% share of the Islamic banking sector and approximately 12% of the total domestic banking sector. As of end 2016, ...

Citizens
1 Citizens Plaza, Providence, 02903, US
Last Update: 22/04/2026
At Citizens, we recognize that the journey to accomplishment is no longer linear and that individuals are made of all they have done and all they are going to do. As one of the oldest and largest financial services firms in the United States with a history dating back t...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Qatar Islamic Bank (QIB)







Citizens






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Qatar Islamic Bank (QIB) in 2026.
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
Citizens has 2.91% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Qatar Islamic Bank (QIB) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Qatar Islamic Bank (QIB) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Citizens (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Citizens cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Qatar Islamic Bank (QIB)

Citizens
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.