Comparison Overview
PwC Acceleration Center Buenos Aires

PwC Acceleration Center Buenos Aires
ABQ, Félix de Azara 841, C1267 Cdad. Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina, Buenos Aires, AR
Last Update: 01/04/2026
PwC Acceleration Center Buenos Aires es parte de una red global de centros que impulsan el crecimiento de PwC y generan valor para nuestros clientes a través de soluciones innovadoras, talento diverso y tecnologías de vanguardia. Desde Argentina, colaboramos con equipos...

SGS
Zugerstrasse 57, Baar, Zug, CH, 6340
Last Update: 06/09/2026
SGS is the world’s leading Testing, Inspection and Certification company. We operate a network of over 2,500 laboratories and business facilities across 115 countries, supported by a team of 99,500 dedicated professionals. With over 145 years of service excellence, we c...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

PwC Acceleration Center Buenos Aires







SGS






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Professional Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for PwC Acceleration Center Buenos Aires in 2026.
Incidents vs Professional Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for SGS in 2026.
Incident History - PwC Acceleration Center Buenos Aires (X = Date, Y = Severity)
PwC Acceleration Center Buenos Aires cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - SGS (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SGS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

PwC Acceleration Center Buenos Aires

SGS
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.