Comparison Overview
Public Address Solutions by Bosch

Public Address Solutions by Bosch
Eindhoven, NL
Last Update: 21/03/2026
State-of-the-art, top-notch public address and voice alarm (PA/VA) systems by Bosch play a crucial role in addressing security and safety concerns. As a global leader and supplier of such systems, we ensure optimum effectiveness for our customers, as our PA/VA systems e...

TDK
2-5-1 Nihonbashi, Chuo-ku, 103-6128, JP
Last Update: 24/09/2026
TDK Corporation is a world leader in electronic solutions for the smart society based in Tokyo, Japan. Built on a foundation of material sciences mastery, TDK welcomes societal transformation by resolutely remaining at the forefront of technological evolution. It was es...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Public Address Solutions by Bosch







TDK






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Public Address Solutions by Bosch in 2026.
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for TDK in 2026.
Incident History - Public Address Solutions by Bosch (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Public Address Solutions by Bosch cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - TDK (X = Date, Y = Severity)
TDK cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Public Address Solutions by Bosch

TDK
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.