Comparison Overview
PT. FUJIFILM Indonesia

PT. FUJIFILM Indonesia
Eightyeight@Kasablanka Building Tower A, 36th Floor, Jl. Kasablanka Raya, Kav.88, Jakarta Selatan 12870, Jakarta, DKI Jakarta, 12870, ID
Last Update: 20/03/2026
PT FUJIFILM Indonesia is a direct subsidiary of Fujifilm Holdings Corporation, Japan and was officially established in September 2011. In addition to the head office in Jakarta, PT Fujifilm Indonesia also has branch offices in Surabaya, Bandung, Yogyakarta and Makassar....

ALS
25 King St, Bowen Hills, Queensland, AU, 4006
Last Update: 13/09/2026
A global leader in testing, ALS provides comprehensive testing solutions to clients in a wide range of industries around the world. Using state-of-the-art technologies and innovative methodologies, our dedicated international teams deliver highest-quality testing servic...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

PT. FUJIFILM Indonesia







ALS






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs International Trade and Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for PT. FUJIFILM Indonesia in 2026.
Incidents vs International Trade and Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ALS in 2026.
Incident History - PT. FUJIFILM Indonesia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
PT. FUJIFILM Indonesia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - ALS (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ALS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

PT. FUJIFILM Indonesia

ALS
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.