Comparison Overview
PROTO® Industrial Tools

PROTO® Industrial Tools
400 Executive Blvd, None, Southington, Connecticut, US, 06489
Last Update: 25/03/2026
PROTO® Industrial Tools, part of Stanley Black & Decker's Industrial & Automotive division manufactures, markets and sells industrial hand tools to professionals worldwide. Pros who work the most demanding jobs, demand the most from their tools. Which is why every day...

Tata Electronics
Bengaluru , IN
Last Update: 04/07/2026
Tata Electronics is a prominent global player in the electronics manufacturing industry, with fast-emerging capabilities in Electronics Manufacturing Services, Semiconductor Assembly and Test, Semiconductor Foundry, and Design Services. Established in 2020 as a greenf...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

PROTO® Industrial Tools







Tata Electronics






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for PROTO® Industrial Tools in 2026.
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
Tata Electronics has 94.17% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - PROTO® Industrial Tools (X = Date, Y = Severity)
PROTO® Industrial Tools cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Tata Electronics (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Tata Electronics cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

PROTO® Industrial Tools

Tata Electronics
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A security vulnerability has been detected in adafap api-mcp up to 92b9a5d04acfec165c7d4ef852496593aa87be06. This affects the function customAxios of the file app/api/proxy/route.ts of the component Proxy API Endpoint. The manipulation of the argument url leads to server-side request forgery. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. This product adopts a rolling release strategy to maintain continuous delivery. Therefore, version details for affected or updated releases cannot be specified. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A weakness has been identified in PhialsBasement KoboldCPP-MCP-Server 1.0.0. Affected by this issue is the function makeRequest of the file src/index.ts of the component BaseConfigSchema. Executing a manipulation of the argument apiUrl can lead to server-side request forgery. It is possible to launch the attack on the local host. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A security flaw has been discovered in Handwriting-OCR handwriting-ocr-mcp-server 0.1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is the function fs.readFileSync of the file src/index.ts of the component upload_document. Performing a manipulation of the argument File results in path traversal. Attacking locally is a requirement. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A vulnerability was identified in Nikolaibibo claude-comfyui-mcp 1.0.0. Affected is the function copyFileSync of the file src/tools/utils.ts of the component comfy_upload_image. Such manipulation of the argument image_path leads to path traversal. An attack has to be approached locally. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in nltk/nltk versions 3.9.4 and the current develop branch. The `nltk.pathsec.validate_network_url()` function, intended to prevent SSRF by rejecting internal network addresses, fails to reject IPs in the RFC 6598 shared address space (`100.64.0.0/10`). This occurs because Python's `ipaddress` module does not classify such addresses as `is_private` or `is_global`, and the current guard only checks `is_private` and a few explicit categories. An attacker who can influence a URL passed to NLTK's network-loading helpers can exploit this vulnerability to make a strict-mode application send requests to shared-address-space hosts, potentially exposing non-public infrastructure reachable from the application host. The impact is limited to SSRF-style confidentiality exposure, with no code execution claimed.