Comparison Overview
Progressive Independent Agents

Progressive Independent Agents
N/A
Last Update: 03/04/2026
Independent agents have been integral to our success since our founding in 1937, and investing in the channel is a long-term, strategic priority for Progressive. We’re proud to serve more than 40,000 independent agents as we work to become their #1 choice and destinatio...

Mapfre
Carretera de Pozuelo, 52, Majadahonda, Community of Madrid, ES, 28220
Last Update: 03/09/2026
At Mapfre, we’ve spent more than 90 years supporting people and businesses around the world, taking care of what matters most to them. We offer insurance, financial, and service solutions that evolve with you. Our experience and commitment, combined with a constant focu...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Progressive Independent Agents







Mapfre






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
Progressive Independent Agents has 35.06% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Mapfre in 2026.
Incident History - Progressive Independent Agents (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Progressive Independent Agents cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Mapfre (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Mapfre cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Progressive Independent Agents

Mapfre
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.